

A
CRITIQUE OF KANT.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN
BY
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FROM THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE

FOR the New Edition of the fifth volume of my *History of Modern Philosophy*, which comprises Fichte and his forerunners, I have written, as an "Introduction to Post-Kantian Philosophy," a *Critique of Kant*, which I herewith publish separately. The first four chapters are entirely new; the fifth gives in revised form the substance of the first chapter of the original volume on Fichte.

I formerly thought it right, as well as suited to the plan of my work, to add a short critique of the Kantian philosophy to the history of the development of post-Kantian philosophy,—which in all its branches grows out of a *criticism* of the former,—and to reserve an exhaustive critique till the close of the whole, when the reader will have become acquainted with all the standpoints which attempt a solution of the Kantian problems, and which have thus exercised an influence upon the Kantian epoch. And I still hold this view, which is in keeping with the historic method. But I also wish my work to serve the needs of the immediate present, and I have thought that a comprehensive and thorough criticism of Kant's doctrines, which should be guided by a correct conception of his whole system, might prove espe-

cially *a propos* at this time, and contribute something towards correcting the many errors about Kant which are spread abroad in the literature of the day.

On a number of critical questions relating to Kant's chief work, which I was obliged to investigate at the close of the third volume of my *History of Modern Philosophy*, my views have met with some opposition at the hands of competent critics. For that reason, if for no other, I felt it incumbent upon me again to take up those questions, and to carry out the criticism there begun in the comprehensive manner at which I have aimed in the present work.

KUNO FISCHER.

HEIDELBERG, 1883.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

PROFESSOR FISCHER'S monumental work on *The History of Modern Philosophy** has been until a recent date wholly inaccessible to English readers. I have therefore thought that his *Critique of Kant*,† which gives the main results of the two volumes on Kant in the "History," together with the Author's criticism of the Kantian doctrines, would be acceptable in English dress, not only as a valuable and suggestive Essay on Kant, but as affording an Introduction to the point of view and method of Professor Fischer's exposition of Modern Philosophy.

The distinguishing feature of the *Critique of Kant* is its

* K. Fischer: *Geschichte der modernen Philosophie*, 6 Bde, München. Fr. Bassermann. An English version of the first volume on *Descartes and His School* has appeared within this year. It is earnestly to be hoped that a work which would render such important service to philosophical culture in England and America, as the translation of Professor Fischer's entire "History," may be carried forward to completion. Meanwhile, the present fragment, translated nearly two years ago, before this larger undertaking was made known, may not be valueless. Certainly it is the hope of the translator that it may stimulate not a few to a study of the larger work.

† K. Fischer: *Kritik der kantischen Philosophie*, München, Fr. Bassermann, 1883. As Prof. Fischer tells us in his Preface, this work, besides being published separately, also appears as part of the fifth volume of the "History."

comprehension of Kant's whole philosophy. "Exposition of Kant," or "Criticism of Kant," too often means exposition or criticism of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Professor Fischer everywhere emphasizes the importance of basing all criticism of Kant upon the *whole* of his philosophy. "In criticising the Kantian philosophy," he tells us (p. 146), "we should always remember that it by no means issued from the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a finished system, but that, on the contrary, it continued to develop, and reached results which were not involved in that work, which do not accord with its fundamental principles, and cannot be adjusted to them by any attempt at artificial symmetries," etc. Again, he says (p. 156), "If we now compare the foundation of the Kantian criticism with its completion, or the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the *Critique of Judgment*, it clearly appears how the work has progressed and been transformed under the hands of the philosopher. Neither the doctrine of phenomena, nor that of things-in-themselves, has remained the same," etc. We are familiar with the great transition which Kant's philosophic thinking underwent when he turned his back upon the old metaphysics, but it has not always been made sufficiently prominent that his mental attitude underwent important changes, and made important advances, even after entering upon the Critical period. It is the merit of Kuno Fischer to have emphasized and illustrated so forcibly and fully this *development* in the (Critical) philosophy of Kant; and it is this, if we mistake not, which especially commends his *Critique* to the attention of philosophical students, and entitles it to be considered

s in some real sense a *contribution* to the criticism of Kant.

It is also believed that the *Critique* will be found a valuable General Introduction to the study of Kant. Professor Fischer's lucid and vigorous style is well-known, and perhaps nowhere are these qualities better displayed than in the concise yet comprehensive statement of this epitome. It is thought that the clear exposition of "Transcendental Idealism," and the masterly discussion of the "Thing-in-itself"—that bugbear of the Kantian Philosophy—will prove especially helpful.

The translation has aimed to be exact, and has sought to retain something of the manner of the original. The notoriously troublesome word *Vorstellung* has been uniformly rendered "idea," this rendering being, perhaps, on the whole, the most satisfactory. The more nearly equivalent word, "presentation," is coming into general use in psychological discussions, but besides being often unwieldy, its application is too restricted to meet the more general use of *Vorstellung* in the present work. The verb *vorzustellen* has generally been rendered "to conceive" or "mentally represent." The verbal noun *Vorstellen*, as in "*Gesetze unseres Vorstellens*," has been uniformly rendered "thought." In such connections, this word is used by Professor Fischer as comprehending perception and understanding, *i.e.*, as designating all finite thought, or, all thought conditioned by space and time, and hence, from the Critical point of view, as being co-extensive with theoretical, or scientific, or knowing reason. The reader will please carefully distinguish idea

(*Vorstellung*) from Idea (*Idee*), which also frequently occurs. It is thought that no especial apology is needed for the retention of the word *Aufklärung*. In quoting from Kant, Professor Fischer has made use of Hartenstein's *first* edition (Leipzig, Leop. Voss. 1838).

I am indebted to Dr. W. T. Harris for the kind permission to republish this *Critique* from the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, where it first appeared. With the exception of a few unimportant omissions, and a number of verbal changes, it appears here unaltered.

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PARIS, Aug. 31st, 1887

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CHAPTER I.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE.

IN undertaking a criticism of the Kantian philosophy, it will be necessary, first of all, to review briefly its fundamental principles, in order to correct any false or distorted view which might destroy the conception of the system. For we can justly criticise only what we have rightly understood. And from a critical knowledge of the system there follows the establishment of those new problems contained in it, which determine the course of the development of post-Kantian philosophy. We shall proceed, therefore, from the characterization of the Kantian doctrines to their criticism, and then deduce the problems which have led to their transformation and development.

The Kantian philosophy as a whole unites in itself three fundamental features, which must be rightly conceived, and rightly combined, if we are to appreciate the full peculiarity of this philosophy which swayed the last century: they are *Doctrine of Knowledge*, *Doctrine of Freedom*, and *Doctrine of Development*. Its new doctrine of knowledge conditions its new doctrine of

freedom, and both of these condition its new doctrine of development. These themes are arranged in the order in which they follow one another in the course of the Critical investigation.

The first problem, and that which determines all the fundamental questions of the Kantian inquiry, is concerned with the origin of human knowledge. There is no simpler expression with which to designate Kant's fundamental problem, and at the same time the criterion which guided him in its solution. It also furnishes us the best means of keeping our bearings in reference to the nature and method of his system. That *this* problem was never fairly recognised, not to say solved, before Kant, we have shown in our characterization of the epoch of Critical philosophy and the pre-Kantian standpoints sufficiently in detail to be able to refer the reader to that earlier discussion.¹

I. THE DOCTRINE OF PHENOMENA. TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM.

1. *The Origin of Phenomena.*

If light is to be thrown upon the origin of human knowledge, those conditions must be investigated which precede it, which, consequently, must be contained in the faculties of our intel-

¹ *Vide Fischer : Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, vol. iii., pp. 3-38.

lectual nature, but which are not yet knowledge itself. The philosophers before Kant, some with full intention, others with complete self-deception, presupposed these conditions, and thus treated the explanation of human knowledge dogmatically. They consequently failed of the solution, and in the very matter of importance attained nothing. Hence the problem had to be restated, and so taken that the factors or conditions of knowledge were sought by a new investigation of human reason along that path which Kant called *critical* or *transcendental*. Knowledge is unexplained as long as its origin remains obscure. This obvious proposition is valid not only in reference to knowledge, but also in reference to every object of knowledge; for to know an object means as much as to understand its origination. Hence there can be no talk about a knowledge of objects as long as their origin remains unknown. The inquiry concerning the origin of human knowledge necessarily coincides, therefore, with that concerning the origin of our *objects of knowledge*, or of things knowable to us. All our objects of knowledge are, and must be, *phenomena*, which we represent to ourselves in thought; nor does it here come immediately into question whether the nature of things reveals itself in phenomena adequately, or inadequately, or not at all. The inquiry concerning the origin of our objects of knowledge is accordingly identical

with that concerning the origin of phenomena, or of the phenomenal world, *i.e.*, those phenomena which appear to the human reason as such, or which we all conceive and experience in a common way. The content of these phenomena is our *world of sense*. That we have and conceive such a common world of sense may be regarded as an established and uncontroverted fact; and this common world would be impossible if we were not compelled to conceive things in a common manner, or according to the same laws. The inquiry concerning the origin of human knowledge is thus seen, as soon as it is taken up seriously and thoroughly, to involve the inquiry concerning the origin of the sense-world, or of that idea of the world common to us all. The problem of knowledge cannot be recast, and the conditions involved in its process investigated, without stating the question in the manner just developed. Just as we can rightly contemplate the stellar world only after we have won that point of view from which the situation and motion of our own earth become apparent, so we can rightly apprehend and estimate the world of sense only when we have attained an insight into the standpoint and activity of our knowing reason. The *Critical* or *Transcendental* point of view in philosophy corresponds to the *Copernican* in astronomy.

If we ourselves create an object, its origination is as intelligible to us as our own activity, and the object itself is consequently completely knowable. If, on the other hand, there is that contained in the object which has and retains the character of something *given*, something which we cannot produce, or which cannot be reduced to our creative activity, then our knowledge will come at this point upon an impenetrable barrier. The objects of our knowledge are, therefore, just as far completely knowable as they are our *products*, *i.e.*, just as far as we are capable of creating them and of making the process of this creation clear to our consciousness; *only* so far does the knowableness of things extend. Accordingly, the inquiry concerning the origin of our knowledge and its objects, the sum-total of which constitutes our common world of sense, is more exactly to be taken, so that under the term "origin" shall be understood *creation* by the factors or capacities of our reason. If our world of sense is the product of our reason, it is also the completely intelligible object of our reason; it is this object *only so far* as it is this product. "For one thoroughly comprehends only what one can himself completely produce according to notions." ¹

¹ Kant: *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, § 68. (*Werke*, vol. vi., p. 258.) Cf. Fischer: *Geschichte der neuen Philosophie*, vol. iv., p. 483.

2. The Ideality of Phenomena.

Now Kant has shown that there is an *element* in all our phenomena which has and retains the character of something given—namely, our *impressions* or *sensations*. These, however, as such, are not yet objects or phenomena, but only the material out of which objects and phenomena arise in accordance with the laws of our thought, or through the form-giving power of our perception and understanding. Thus the sense-world originates from the material of our impressions, which are so formed and combined, in accordance with the necessary and involuntarily fulfilled laws of our thought, that we all conceive the same natural order of things. The laws of thought are the fundamental forms of perception and understanding—space, time, and the categories. The involuntary or unconscious fulfilment of these laws takes place through the imagination, while the knowledge of them is a matter of critical inquiry. 4

Since the laws of thought make phenomena and experience, they must precede the latter, and are, therefore, not given empirically and *a posteriori*, but *a priori*, or *transcendentally*; they are the forms, the sensations on the contrary, the stuff or matter, of phenomena. This matter is received by our reason; it is given to it, not produced by it; therefore it is not *a priori*,

but a posteriori. Yet we may not say that our impressions are, given a posteriori or empirically. This inexact and incorrect expression utterly confounds the Kantian doctrine. What we draw from experience, or what is given by experience—this is a posteriori or empirical. Kant expressly teaches: "That which is borrowed merely from experience is known only a posteriori or empirically."¹ Now, it appears that since impressions constitute the matter of all phenomena and experience, they belong to the conditions and elements of experience, hence are contained in it, but not produced by it; they do not result from experience, but experience from them. That is empirical which is given to us through experience. Sensations are the material of experience, and are, therefore, given for it, not produced by it. Kant explicitly says: "Perception which is related to an object through sensation is empirical."² An empirical object presupposes sensation. Although this relation is self-evident, it is still very necessary to enforce the correct conception of it, since we are so often compelled to hear: Kant taught that the form of our knowledge is given a priori, the matter a posteriori or empirically. If so, then Kant must have contradictorily taught that the matter for experience is given by experience!

¹ Kant: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Introd. III., Note. (*Werke*, vol. ii., p. 39.)

² Id. *Transc. Aesth.*, § 1 (p. 59, et seq.).

Then he has not explained experience, but, like his predecessors, presupposed it; then the ground of sensations must be sought in experience; then the thing-in-itself lies hidden in phenomena; then the Kantian philosophy is turned completely upside down.

Since our sense-world consists only in phenomena, it is throughout *phenomenal*. Since the matter of all phenomena consists in sensations, their form in perceptions and notions, the elements of the same are through and through subjective; both their material and formal constituents are contained in our knowing reason, and have the character of ideas (the word is taken in the broadest sense). Hence all our phenomena are ideas; they consist in being conceived, and are throughout *ideal*. This doctrine of the ideality of all phenomena, and of their origination from our sense states and forms of reason, is called *Transcendental Idealism*.

All phenomena are in time; objective phenomena are also in space. If they contained anything which was independent of our ideas, and which was nevertheless in space and time, the latter could not be the fundamental forms of our ideas, hence not pure perceptions. Since, now, space and time are pure perceptions and nothing real in themselves, everything in space and time must be through and through ideal. The being

of all objects in space and time consists in their being conceived. From the Kantian doctrine of space and time there follows, therefore, the doctrine of the ideality of all phenomena: the *Transcendental Æsthetic* founds that Transcendental idealism which characterizes Kant's entire doctrine of knowledge.

Because space and time are the forms of perception of our reason, the pure magnitudes of space and time, and hence—since there are no other magnitudes—pure magnitudes in general, are the products of the perceptive or constructive activity of our reason, and as such they are completely knowable. The doctrine of magnitudes or pure mathematics has, therefore, before all other theoretical sciences, the character of a perfectly evident and purely rational knowledge. It was this fact which led Kant to declare, "that in each of the natural sciences precisely as much exact science can be found as there is mathematics."¹

A refutation of the *Transcendental Æsthetic* would affect the whole doctrine of Transcendental idealism, and thereby the entire basis and character of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, and the Critical philosophy in general. But a false interpreta-

¹ Kant: *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*. Preface. (*Werke*, vol. viii., p. 444.)

tion is no refutation. We have now to concern ourselves with views which mistake the sense of the Kantian doctrine and thus attack it with arguments which necessarily prove ineffectual.

II. OBJECTIONS TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.

To the Kantian doctrine of space and time, as the two fundamental forms of perception of our reason, two objections present themselves, one calling in question the underived or *a priori* (transcendental) character of these two ideas, the other their *anthropological* character. The first denies the unconditional validity of mathematical, and especially geometrical, axioms, and makes the idea of space dependent upon empirical conditions; the second denies the anthropological origin and character of these fundamental perceptions, in order to be free to maintain their cosmological and universal validity. It will suffice, in order to meet these objections, to set the sense of *Kant's doctrine in a clear light.*

1. *First Objection: The Relative Validity of Geometrical*

Axioms.

Kant by no means teaches the unconditional validity of geometrical axioms, but one entirely dependent upon our idea of

space. Why we have this, and not some other perception of space ; why our reason in general is constituted as it is, and not otherwise, these questions Kant leaves, it is true, not untouched and uninvestigated, but yet unsolved ; indeed, he explicitly declares them to be incapable of solution. According to his doctrine, we may regard the constitution of human reason, and the perception of space it involves, as a *primitive fact*, but may not characterize this fact as empirical, since experience is the product of reason, not its condition.

If there were beings possessing perception of space of only two dimensions, this perception would be for them a primitive fact, and in consequence they would just as necessarily be destitute of the ideas of solids, as we must necessarily possess those ideas. If it be true of plane surfaces, that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points in the surface, that between these two points there is only *one* such line, that two straight lines cannot inclose space, etc., these propositions are not nullified by the fact that they do not hold good respecting the connection of two points upon the surface of a sphere, as, *e. g.*, the extremities of a diameter. That a definite perception of space is the luminous ground of knowledge from which certain insights follow, which *under this presupposition* are now and for ever, *i.e.*, *apodictically*, valid—this was the fact which arrested

the attention of Kant, and which he was only able to explain by regarding the original ground of all our ideas of space—space itself—as an underived form of our thought, or as a fundamental perception of our reason.

The validity of our mathematical insights is, therefore, according to the explicit teaching of our philosopher, by no means unconditioned, but, on the contrary, absolutely dependent upon our perception of space and time. But under this presupposition it is apodictic in a way which no other sort of knowledge is. The character of knowledge changes with the change of its conditions. If we should substitute for our discursive understanding an intuitive one, and for our sensuous perception an intellectual perception, knowledge would no longer follow the way of experience, but see and penetrate everything at a glance.¹ If we should substitute for our *external* perception of space, *i.e.*, the perception of space of three dimensions, some other, the character and compass of our mathematical ideas would change accordingly, but not the apodictical certitude of judgments based upon the corresponding construction and perceptive insight. This point contains the fact which at once characterizes and explains the nature of mathematics. Hence those objections which found

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 20-26.

upon another perception of space some other sort of geometry and its axioms are so little calculated to refute Kant's doctrine that they much more may and should appeal to it.

If it can be proved that 2×2 is not in *all* cases equal to 4, that in our perception of a plane surface a straight line does not in all instances describe the shortest distance between two points, etc., then for the first time is Kant's doctrine refuted. To him pure mathematics seemed the only science in which knowing and creating, thought and object, were one and the same. Because pure magnitudes are constructions, or the products of perception, he regarded space and time as the perceptions of reason, or as the perceptive activity of reason itself. Because our notions of magnitude presuppose the perceptive or sensible knowledge of magnitude, he regarded space and time as the fundamental forms of *sense*, not of understanding.

Even if these objections, which seek to base themselves upon the empirical origin of geometry, were stronger than they are, they would still prove ineffectual against the doctrine of the ideality of all phenomena, since they refer only to space, not to *time*. If time is a pure idea, or a form of perception, phenomena in time can contain nothing independent of all ideas. Now, *all* phenomena are in time, the objective as well as the subjective. But if objective phenomena are ideas, then space, since it con-

tains all objective phenomena, can be nothing real in itself, but only the fundamental form of our external perception. The transcendental ideality of time establishes the ideality of *all* phenomena, even that of *objective* phenomena, hence also that of space.

2. *Second Objection : The Uncritical View of the World.*

The objections which our common consciousness opposes to the systems of great thinkers are in their eyes generally the most insignificant of all, yet because of the constant obstruction they offer to the comprehension and diffusion of their views, they always prove themselves the most potent ; for, like our feelings and sensations, they are not to be silenced with reasons, and are, as Schiller says in *Wallenstein*, "like the women who always come back to their first word when one has preached reason for hours." Such an inflexible and uncritical way of thinking has always found the most fault, among all the doctrines of Kant, with the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, since it maintains that space and time are mere perceptions of *human* reason, and nothing apart from the latter. Accordingly, as it seems, space and time must first appear in the world with our reason, hence with the existence of man, and can therefore neither exist before him, nor endure after him. Now, we are obliged to conceive the

human race as having originated and as perishable, and yet we cannot possibly conceive the universe, which contains in itself the conditions of the origin as well as the destruction of the earth and its inhabitants, without space and time. It seems highly absurd, therefore, to seek to confine these two fundamental conditions of all natural existence to the organization and limits of human reason. Kant himself, indeed, before introducing his new doctrine of the ideality of space and time, taught the mechanical origin and development of the cosmos, and the natural history of the heavens, and of the earth and its organic life. But with this view of the world as an historical development the idealistic doctrine of space and time appears to stand in the most open opposition. Surely Kant could not have been sensible of this contradiction, since he has nowhere made it the subject of especial discussion and explanation. Meanwhile the natural consciousness, which, with its ideas of space and time, finds the Kantian perfectly unintelligible, is not disabused of its objections. But Kant's doctrine of space and time is the foundation of his doctrine of knowledge, and the way to his doctrine of freedom. Nothing, therefore, would remain of the Critical philosophy if *this* doctrine be rejected.

In fact, there is *no* contradiction between Kant's view of the world as a natural development in time and his *Critique of Pure*

Reason. In the first place, both have different subjects of inquiry : that of the first is the explanation of the world, that of the second the explanation of knowledge. The problem of the explanation of the world is : How did the *world* in which we live originate according to natural and mechanical laws ? The problem of the *Critique* is : How did this our *explanation of the world* originate according to the laws of our reason and thought ? There the question is regarding the phenomena of nature, here regarding the knowableness of the same. These phenomena would not be phenomena, *i.e.*, they would not *appear* to us, if they were not intelligible and knowable. The entire fact of our idea of the world would not exist, if natural objects were inconceivable or contained anything inconceivable. And this would necessarily be the case, if the elements of which they consisted were not determined by the character and conditions of our thought. Their matter is determined by the manifold of our impressions, which we receive by means of sense, and consequently regard as *given* ; these impressions are the matter of phenomena. Their form is determined by the *laws* of our thought, which we regard as pure forms of reason, and the content of which Kant called pure reason ; these laws constitute the form of phenomena. Phenomena, therefore, are through and through *ideas*. Phenomena, objects of experience, and the *progressive Science of Experience*,

are all created from the matter of our sensations in accordance with the rational laws of our thought, the latter having partly the character of constitutive, partly that of regulative, principles. These laws determine the world of phenomena, because they constitute it. They are, therefore, within the realm of phenomena, *world-conditions* or *world-principles*. But their meaning is entirely mistaken when only an anthropological or psychological validity is ascribed to them. They cannot be established by psychology, because they first make psychology itself possible. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is no anthropological investigation.

And here those objections which our unscientific view of the world oppose to the Critical philosopher and his doctrine of space and time refute themselves. Space and time are the laws of perception imposed by our reason, and as such they determine the entire world of sense, because they first make it in general possible. Their cosmical or universal validity—which the natural sense so rightly demands and holds fast—is therefore so far from being disproved by the *Critique of Pure Reason* that it is, the rather, thereby first really established. At the same time, however, this validity is limited in such a way that there may still be something independent of space and time, while the common consciousness, uncritical and thoughtless as it is, regards

space as the huge box, and time as the vast stream, in which everything that is must be contained.

Man, as a natural individual, or as anthropology regards him, belongs to the phenomena of nature, and is a part of the world of sense. He is the result of a definite stage in the world's history—a stage which forms a link in the chain of cosmic changes, and which presupposes a succession of earlier stages. That the origin and development of man must be regarded and investigated as natural, historical facts, Kant was so far from denying that he rather proposed to himself that thesis; and he demonstrated by his criticism of reason, and more especially by his doctrine of space and time, that its necessity follows from the conditions of our knowledge. Natural, historical man is, therefore, by no means the sole proprietor of space and time; they are not dependent upon him, but he, like all phenomena in general, is conditioned by them. When space and time are called the pure perceptions of *human* reason, it is important to distinguish the sense in which this word is taken; it denotes man as the *knowing subject*, not as one of the objects of knowledge. As the subject of all knowledge—so far as we are capable of investigating the latter—our reason is the condition of all objects in general, or of the entire world of sense, in which in the course of time the natural human

race appears and develops itself in successive stages, each of which necessarily implies a preceding and a succeeding stage. For all phenomena are in time; each has its time-duration, before and after which there is time, since they all originate and pass away, with the single exception of matter, which persists. But the knowing subject is not in time, but time in it, for time is the fundamental form of sensuous thought.

If, on the other hand, space and time be regarded, with Schopenhauer, as the forms of perception of our intellect, and at the same time be declared to be animal functions of the brain, then there arises for the first time that absurdity which obviously describes a *circulus vitiosus*—viz., space and time are made dependent upon a condition, which, like the animal organism and the stages of nature and animal life preceding it, is itself only possible under the conditions of space and time. If the latter are, as Schopenhauer teaches, the "*principium individuationis*," i.e., the ground of all multiplicity and diversity, then they cannot possibly be, as, notwithstanding, Schopenhauer also teaches, the products or functions of individual organisms. Nor was Schopenhauer ever able successfully to explain away or to solve this erroneous circle, grounded as it is in a fundamental feature of his doctrine.

III. THE DOCTRINE OF THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES.

1. *The Sensuousness of Pure Reason.*

The knowing subject is not in space and time, but these in it; hence the entire world in space and time is pure phenomenon or idea; it is through and through phenomenal and ideal. This doctrine constitutes the Transcendental Idealism, which founds and characterizes the Kantian doctrine of knowledge. If, now, in the knowing subject there was nothing given, but, on the contrary, everything was *created* by it, the world of phenomena would be entirely its product; its notions would be immediate perceptions, its faculty of knowledge would consist in perceptive thought, *i.e.*, in an intuitive understanding, or in an intellectual perception, to which everything it creates appears at once as object or thing. Then knowing and creating would be completely identical, then there would be no difference between sense and understanding, perception and thought, objects and notions, phenomena and things-in-themselves.

Such a faculty of knowledge is not in itself impossible or inconceivable, but it is *not* the one we possess; ours does not create things, but develops itself and its objects. Kant taught repeatedly, and indeed always, with the utmost explicitness,

that our understanding is discursive, not intuitive, our perception sensuous, not intellectual. Accordingly he carefully distinguished between sense and understanding, and explained human knowledge in such a way that it is from the matter of impressions and sensations, which have and retain the character of something given, that we produce phenomena, and the knowledge of phenomena, or experience.

Intuitive understanding is creative, and therefore divine ; but human understanding is not intuitive ; nor is it pure subject, for to the character of human reason, as Kant investigates it in his *Critique*, there belongs *sensuousness*, *i.e.*, the capacity of receiving, and being sensible of, impressions, or of being affected by a manifold. Sense must not be identified with the organs of sense, which are its medium, nor with the definite sensations they convey, since these belong to the constitution of the human body. Yet our sensations as such presuppose a faculty of sense or receptivity, which enables us to be affected by a variety of impressions, and without which the matter of knowledge would fail, *i.e.*, knowledge would remain empty, hence in general not exist at all. This sensuousness Kant ascribes to pure reason, since it is not, in the first place, a question of the sort of affections or the quality of impressions, but only of the capacity itself of receiving something given. Our reason must form and

work up the given material, according to the laws of its perception and thought, into phenomena, experience, and empirical knowledge.

Our knowing reason would be creative, hence divine, if it were not *sensuous*, *i.e.*, capable of being affected by impressions, which it must receive, and which it can only combine and systematize. It is therefore not generative of the matter of knowledge, but merely *form-giving*, not creative, but *architectonic*. Since it does not make the matter of knowledge, but only receives it, it is receptive, and in this respect not original, but dependent. And the entire organization of its knowing faculty is conditioned by its sensuousness. Sense is one faculty, understanding another; this is receptive of material, that form-giving and productive; this is passive, that active; this receives impressions, that creates notions. Hence our perceptive faculty is not intellectual, but sensuous, our understanding not intuitive, but discursive, *i.e.*, it is obliged to take up its perceptions one by one, and proceed by connecting part with part, comparing perception with perception, and by uniting these to pass from perceptions to notions and judgments. Consequently the objects of our knowing reason are not entirely its own products; they are constructed out of matter and form; the former is given to it, the latter is given or added by it. Our knowledge of things

(objects), therefore, consists in a gradual experience; it is not complete in an instant, but originates and develops itself. We are obliged to think objects in *succession*, and hence also in *co-existence*; since nothing would persist in a *mere* succession, thus also nothing could be thought. Space and time are therefore the fundamental conditions, or, since nothing can be thought without them, the *fundamental forms*, of our thought; they are, since every perception must be combined part by part, the fundamental forms of perception, and since our perceptive faculty is not intellectual, but sensuous, the fundamental forms of sense: in short, they are the *fundamental perceptions* of our reason.

With a creative or divine reason, knowing and creating, idea and thing, must be one and the same. It could be conditioned by neither space nor time. Our reason is distinguished from the divine by its sensuousness; with it, space and time are the necessary forms of all thought and of all knowledge. We ourselves are the only sensuous-rational beings which we know. Hence sensuous reason is for us equivalent to human reason. And thus, since *sense* belongs to the pure reason which Kant investigated in his *Critique*, it was called by him—although the only reason knowable to us—*human* reason. Now sense, as the capacity of receiving material, is of a dependent and derived

nature. And this must be true of the entire organization and constitution of our knowing reason, since without sensuousness it would be an entirely different one from what it is.¹

Let us hear Kant himself. Quite at the beginning of the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, he says: "The capacity of receiving ideas in the manner in which we are affected by objects I call *sense*. By means of sense, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us *perceptions*; objects are thought, however, by the understanding, and it is from the latter that *notions* arise." "The action of an object upon the faculty of representation—that is, so far as we are affected by it—is *sensation*. Perception which is related to an object through sensation is *empirical*. The indeterminate object of an empirical perception I call *phenomenon*. That in phenomena which corresponds to sensation I call the *matter* of phenomena; that, however, which makes it possible that the manifold of phenomena be disposed in certain relations I call the *form* of the same. Since that whereby sensations can alone be ordered and set in definite form cannot itself again be sensation,² so, although the matter

¹ On the discursive and intuitive understanding, Cf. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iv., pp. 494--498.

² Kant reads *Empfindung* (sensation) here, not *Erscheinung* (phenomenon), as given in the text of Prof. Fischer. Also in the following quotation, beginning "It is not necessary," etc., the edition of Benno Erdmann has been

of all phenomena is indeed, given only *à posteriori*, the form of the same must, on the contrary, already lie *à priori* as an entirety in the mind, and, consequently, must be capable of being considered wholly apart from sensation" ¹ At the close of the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, Kant says "It is not necessary, either, that we limit perception in space and time to human sensibility. It may be that all finite thinking beings are necessarily like man in this respect (although that cannot be determined), yet it would not cease, even on account of this universality, to be *sense*, because it is a *derived* (*intuitus derivatus*), not an original (*intuitus originarius*), hence not an intellectual, perception. Such a perception seems, on the ground just brought forward, to belong only to the Primitive Being, not, however, to a being dependent as well in its existence as in its perception, which latter determines the relation of its existence to given objects. This last observation in our Æsthetic theory, however, must be regarded merely as an explanation, not as anything fundamental." ²

followed, instead of reading in the affirmative (It is necessary) with the edition from which Prof Fischer quotes (Vid Preface. Hartenstein in his *second* edition also makes the correction), as the sense certainly requires this reading — TR.

¹ Kant: *Kritik d. r. Vernunft Transc. Elementarlehre*, Part I, § 1 (*Werke*, vol. II, pp. 59, 60.)

² Ibid: § 81 (vol III, p. 86, *et seq*)

2. The Thing-in-itself.

Our knowing reason is accordingly not creative in reference to the matter of all phenomena and knowledge, but merely receptive. It receives this matter in virtue of its sensuousness ; hence the latter is dependent and conditioned. And here arises the necessary inquiry concerning the *origin* of our impressions or sensations. Since these are the material which our faculties of knowledge mould and form, they cannot themselves proceed from the latter, but are rather the necessary conditions by which these faculties are aroused and set into activity. And, since they constitute the matter of all phenomena, we cannot derive them from phenomena, without falling into the erroneous circle of first deducing phenomena from impressions, and then impressions from phenomena. Indeed, they can in no way originate from the world of sense, since the world of sense first arises from them. From this it appears that the *origin* of our sensations is not itself a phenomenon, and hence does not constitute a knowable object. It is the subject of necessary inquiry, but not that of knowledge. It is something which precedes and underlies all experience, but which itself can never be felt, conceived, nor experienced. This unknown and unknowable object is that transcendental *X* which the Kantian doctrine must neces-

sarily have met with in the course of its inquiry beyond, or, more exactly, within the limits of human reason.

There must be something which causes the impressions we receive, something which underlies our sensibility, and therefore with the whole constitution of our knowing reason, something therefore which also underlies all phenomena and the entire sense-world. But precisely on this account it cannot itself be anything sensible, cannot be a phenomenon, cannot be an object of knowledge. This "supersensible substratum" Kant calls *Thing-in-itself*, designating thereby that transcendental *X* which the *Critique of Pure Reason* introduces, and which it sees itself, on the grounds pointed out, obliged to introduce into its calculation. It is called thing-in-itself in distinction from all phenomena. If our reason were not sensuous, but divine, not receptive, but creative, then its ideas would be things themselves, then there would be no difference between phenomena and things-in-themselves. Since, however, it is sensuous, space and time are the fundamental forms of its perception, its objects of knowledge are phenomena, and these merely ideas, hence not things-in-themselves. Consequently, in the Critical investigation of reason, we must distinguish between phenomena and things-in-themselves with the utmost precision, regarding every attempt to unite the two as the cause of irremediable confusion.

Now, because the objects which relate themselves to the thing-in-itself, or the relations which the latter sustains, are so numerous and so unlike, we see why the thing-in-itself appears in Kant's teaching in so many and different connections. For it is the supersensible substratum at once of our sensibility and of the whole constitution of our knowing reason ; hence it is the hidden ground of all phenomena, the objective as well as the subjective, and therefore the substratum of the entire sense world. In reference to sense, which is merely receptive of the matter of knowledge, it appears as the matter-giving principle, or as the cause of our sensations. In reference to the constitution of our knowing reason in general, it is represented as the hidden ground of our mode of perception and thought, *i.e.*, as the cause of our perceiving and thinking, and mentally representing to ourselves objective and subjective phenomena. Since phenomena are in space and time, and hence consist throughout in external relations, the thing-in-itself is called, in distinction therefrom, "the *inner*, that which belongs to objects in themselves,"—an expression which needs careful attention, lest the radically false impression be received that the thing-in-itself lies hidden somewhere *in* phenomena. The meaning is rather, that the thing-in-itself is not external, not related to another, hence not in space and time at all. Since all phenomena are empirical

objects, the thing-in-itself is called in distinction therefrom "*the transcendental object*." Since all phenomena are ideas, and not objects external to and independent of thought, the thing-in-itself is called "*the true correlate* of our ideas." And, since phenomena alone are objects of knowledge, the thing-in-itself denotes the bounds of our knowledge, or "*the limiting notion* of our understanding." In all these manifold meanings we see no self-transforming Proteus, but one and the same thing, which the philosopher is obliged to exhibit from different points of view according to the various relations which it sustains.

Let us take Kant's own words. He says in the doctrine of space: "The transcendental notion of phenomena in space is a reminder of the Critical philosophy that in general nothing which is perceived in space is a thing-in-itself, nor space a form of things, which might be in itself in some way peculiar to them, but that objects in themselves are for us, indeed, unknown, and what we call external objects are nothing other than pure ideas of our sense, the form of which is space, the *true correlate* of which, however, *i.e.*, the thing-in-itself, is not thereby known, nor can be known; and for the latter no quest, likewise, is made in experience."¹ "For the substantiation of this theory of the

¹ Kant: *Kr. d. r. Vernunft. Tr. Æsth.* § 3. (*Werke*, vol. ii., p. 68, *seq.*)

ideality of external as well as internal sense, hence of all objects of sense as pure phenomena, the observation may be of especial service, that everything in our knowledge which belongs to perception contains nothing except mere relations—namely, the places in a perception (extension), change of place (motion), and the laws according to which this change of place is determined (moving forces). What, however, is present in a place, or what beyond the change of place is occasioned in the things themselves, is not thereby given. Now, a thing-in-itself is not known through mere relations. Hence it is to be carefully noted that, since nothing save pure ideas of relation are given to us through external sense, this also can contain in its idea only the relation of an object to the subject, and not *the inner nature, that which belongs to the object in itself*. With internal perception the conditions are the same.”¹

The substratum of our external and internal perception is also that of our external and internal phenomena, that of the constitution of our knowing reason in general, and of our sensibility and understanding; hence it is the ground of our spatial ideas as well as of our thought. Kant says: “That something which underlies objective phenomena, and which so affects our sense

¹ Kant: *Kr. d. r. Vernunft. Tr. Esth.* § 8. (p. 83).

that it receives the ideas of space, matter, form, etc.—this something, regarded as noumenon (or, better, as transcendental object), might also be at the same time the subject of thought although, through the mode in which our sensibility is thereby affected, we receive no perception of idea, will, etc., but only of space and its determinations. This something, however, is not extended, not impenetrable, not composite, since all these predicates belong only to sense and its perceptions, so far as we are affected by such (otherwise unknown) objects.”¹

That we mentally represent objective and subjective phenomena, that we have sensibility and understanding, that we perceive and think—herein consists the organization of our knowing reason. We discover *that*, but not *why*, our reason is constituted as it is, and not otherwise. To take Kant’s own words again: “The notorious question concerning the community of thought and extension would consequently, if everything imaginary be excluded, amount to the following: *How is external perception—namely, that of space (a filling of the same, form and motion)—in a thinking subject in general possible?* But this question it is impossible to answer. And this gap in our knowledge can never be filled, but only in so far characterised, that external

¹ Kant: *Kr. d. r. Vernunft. Tr. Dialektik; Krit. 2 Paralog*, (p. 667).

phenomena be ascribed to a transcendental object which is the cause of this sort of ideas—an object, however, which we by no means know, and of which we can never obtain a notion. In all the problems that may arise in the field of experience, we treat these phenomena as objects in themselves, without troubling ourselves about the original ground of their possibility (as phenomena). If, however, we go beyond the limits of experience, the notion of a transcendental object becomes necessary.”¹

The philosopher Eberhard, in Halle, who held that after the Leibnitzian doctrine of knowledge Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* was unnecessary and superfluous, made the criticism upon the latter that it was not able to explain the matter of sense—namely, sensations—without things-in-themselves. “Choose which we will,” he says, “we come upon things-in-themselves.” Kant invalidates this stricture by at once admitting and correcting it. He replies: “Now that is precisely the constant assertion of Criticism; only it does not set the ground of the matter of sensuous ideas anew in things, as objects of sense, but in something supersensible, something which lies *at the basis* of sense, and of which we can have no knowledge. Criticism says: ‘Objects, as things-in-themselves, *give* the matter for empirical

¹ Kant: *Kr. d. v. Vernunft. Betrachtung uber d. Summe d. reinen Seelenlehre.* (*Werke*, vol. ii., p. 696, *seq.*)

perceptions (they contain the ground for determining the representative faculty according to its sensuousness), but they *are* not that matter.'"¹

In order to a just estimate and criticism of the Kantian philosophy, it is of vital importance that the doctrine of the thing-in-itself be understood in its origin and development as well as in its scope. It too commonly happens that it is falsely and one-sidedly taken, as when things-in-themselves are referred merely to the objects of knowledge or phenomena, and transferred to them, as if they were contained *in* them, like the kernel in the shell, only that they remain hidden from us as sentient beings. The Empiricists, who, like Bacon and Locke, granted the validity of no other than sensible knowledge, declared things-in-themselves to be unknowable, while the Rationalists, as Descartes and Leibnitz, held sense to be confused understanding; clear and distinct thinking, on the contrary, to be the true form of knowledge, and therefore things-in-themselves to be the true objects of knowledge. Then things-in-themselves and phenomena are the *same* objects; when perceived, they are things as they appear to us; when clearly and distinctly thought,

¹ Vide Kant: *Ueber eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik der Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll* (1790). *Werke*, vol. iii., p. 352.

on the contrary, they are things as they are in themselves. The same thing is, therefore, according to the way in which it is apprehended—whether by sense or by understanding, whether obscurely or distinctly—phenomenon or thing-in-itself. In precisely this confusion Kant saw the fundamental error of the Dogmatic philosophy, and especially that of its metaphysics. According to him, both the above notions are to be absolutely distinguished. The thing-in-itself is the supersensible substratum of phenomena, *because* it is that of our knowing reason, *because* it is that of our sensibility, which has, but does not create, sensations, and receives impressions, which can be caused neither by itself nor by one of its objects.

CHAP.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

I. KANTIAN REALISM

IT is not our purpose at this point to discuss the fundamental doctrines of Kant according to or in discord with another, whether, and in how far, they are uncontroverted, or indeed recognized as incontrovertible. We desire here simply to fix in mind that the recognition of the reality of things-in-themselves, and of their distinction from phenomena, is an essential part of those doctrines. This recognition is related to the doctrine of the ideality of phenomena, as the thing-in-itself to the latter, and it thus forms in the doctrinal edifice of Kant at once the substructure and the necessary completion of Transcendental idealism. To deny or misapprehend the reality of things-in-themselves and their distinction from phenomena means to shake the foundations of the Critical philosophy. When the reality of things-in-themselves is indeed affirmed, but yet they are not properly distinguished from phenomena, there arises that confusion of both which constitutes the character

and fundamental error of the *Transcendental* philosophy. If there were merely things-in-themselves and no phenomena, all knowledge would be impossible. If there were merely phenomena and no things-in-themselves, the sense-world we conceive would be a *dream*. But as all, to be sure, and harmonious, is a mere subjective image without actual ground, the reality of the world consists in its being in-itself, though and through capable of representation in thought, and in its being so represented. This is the characteristic of the Critical philosophy, as Transcendental idealism, teaches and establishes. The reality of the world consists in that which underlies all phenomena—since it underlies all ideas and all faculties of thought—and which is designated by the *Critique* as “thing-in-itself.” In this sense the doctrine of phenomena may be called the Kantian *Idealism*, the doctrine of things-in-themselves the Kantian *Realism*.

II. THE THING-IN-ITSELF AS WILL.

1. *Intelligible Causality.*

Kant regards things-in-themselves as the supersensible substratum of our knowing reason and sense-world, as the matter-giving principle, or as the cause of our sensations. He ascribes to them, accordingly, a *causality* which is to be taken in an

entirely different sense from that category of cause which determines the succession of phenomena in time, and thereby both renders our experience possible and creates it, but which also, precisely on that account, has validity only within the latter. This notion is a rule of the understanding, which may be applied only to phenomena, hence not to things-in-themselves. Kant knew this, and taught it. We must not assume that such a thinker has entangled himself in his own doctrines in so clumsy and apparent a manner as composedly to apply to things-in-themselves the very *same* notion which he had shown to be invalid for them. Kant distinguishes two sorts of causality, which are inherently and essentially unlike: "the conditioned or sensible," and "the unconditioned or intelligible." The former is valid only for phenomena, the succession of which in time is determined and constituted by it alone; the latter is not valid for phenomena, and is independent of all time. Now, things-in-themselves are timeless and causal; hence their causality is the unconditioned and intelligible, which, according to Kant's doctrine, consists in *Freedom* or in pure will; and this constitutes the moral principle of the world.

2. *The Moral Order of the World.*

There is still another world than the sensible and temporal

world, namely, an intelligible world, which is completely independent of the former—a world which must not be thought of and sought after as a heavenly world of spirits existing somewhere beyond our common experience, yet of necessity still in space and time—this would be the way to Swedenborg's Mysticism—but one which we recognize as the *moral world*, that in which the laws of freedom find their recognition and fulfilment. The intelligible world is the *World as Will*, the sensible world is the *World as Idea (Vorstellung)*; the former is related to the latter as thing-in-itself to phenomena; in other words, it is the thing-in-itself, and lies at the basis of the sense-world; hence it is independent of the latter, while this is dependent upon it. But just as the sensible world is related to the intelligible, so our faculty of knowledge must be related to the will, or, what is the same thing, our theoretical to our practical reason; the latter is independent of the former, while the former is dependent upon the latter. Herewith is that relation, determined which Kant called the "*Primacy of Practical Reason.*" He saw himself obliged to hold the reality and causality of things-in-themselves, and to identify the latter, as intelligible causality, with freedom or pure will, and thus to teach the primacy of practical reason. In other words, the true or real principle of the world is, according to Kant, not knowing reason, but will.

The goal of our will is, according to the law of freedom, the *purity* of volition. This goal is to be striven for and attained; the endeavour finds its expression in the purification of the will, which constitutes the real foundation-theme of the moral world. Since, now, without the sense-world no sensuous motives or appetites could be operative in us, hence no material of purification given, it becomes clear that the entire sense-world, unobstructed as to its own laws, constitutes a necessary member and an integral part of the moral world; that it is compassed and swayed by the latter; and that the laws of nature are subordinate to the laws of freedom, although they are thereby in no way suspended or annulled. As thus understood, our sensible life acquires a moral meaning, and becomes a *moral phenomenon*, in which a definite disposition, *i.e.*, the will in a definite state of purity or impurity, reveals and manifests itself. The constancy of this disposition makes our moral conduct seem necessitated, *i.e.*, to be the consequence of our given empirical character. But since it is the *disposition*, or tendency of the will, which appears in our empirical character and forms its principle, the latter must be a *phenomenon of will*, or a *willed phenomenon*, *i.e.*, a phenomenon of the intelligible character or of freedom. Here we see how Kant's doctrine of intelligible and empirical character necessarily follows from his doctrine of freedom and

purification. 'Without the ideality of time and space, there is no possibility of a sense-world, but also no possibility of freedom. Without a sense-world and freedom there is 'no necessity for the purification of the will, no moral phenomena of a sensible and empirical sort, hence no empirical character as a manifestation of the intelligible, and no community of freedom and necessity in the conduct and characters of men. Because Kant first made this unity of freedom and necessity intelligible, Schopenhauer was led to call it "the greatest of all the contributions of human thought." And since the way to this insight could be won *only* through the doctrine of space and time, the same writer extolled the *Transcendental Æsthetic* and the doctrine of intelligible and empirical character as "the two diamonds in the crown of Kantian fame."

III. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND IMMORTALITY

1. *Kantian Theism*

The Idea and recognition of the moral order of the world involves the question regarding the original ground of the same, as also that regarding the attainability of its highest end, namely, the purity of the will. The moral author of the world is *God*, and the purity of the will, or moral perfection, is not to be attainable in a temporal, but only in an *eternal* life, *i.e.*, through the immortality of the soul. According to Kant, the Ideas of

Freedom, God, and Immortality go hand in hand. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* they are merely Ideas (*Ideen*), but in the *Critique of Practical Reason* they have the value of realities; and, indeed, it is only through the reality of freedom and the moral order of the world that the other two Ideas also are realized or made morally certain. It is utterly impossible, from the point of view of the world of sense, to comprehend and demonstrate the existence of freedom, God, and immortality. Indeed, all proofs directed to that end with the means furnished by our theoretical reason must necessarily fail. Critical inquiry reveals the fact that these objects are incapable of demonstration, while at the same time it leaves the question of their reality untouched. Now, the doctrine of the ideality of time and space, and of the sense-world, has already established the possibility of freedom. But since time is purely our idea, we can distinguish ourselves from it, and must do so. There is, then, something in us which is independent of all time; this timeless something is freedom; and as it is the only condition under which the fact of our moral self-consciousness and the activity of the moral law within us can take place, not only the possibility, but the actuality of freedom is to be affirmed. The moral order of the world consists in the fulfilment of the laws of freedom. Without this moral order they would remain empty;

they would not be *laws*, and freedom itself would be a mere fancy. There follows, from the moral order of the world, to which the sensible must be subordinate, the reality of the moral ground of the world (God), and the attainability of the moral end of the world, which includes in itself the perfection of the will, and therefore immortality. These are the so-called moral arguments with which Kant sought to demonstrate, through freedom, the primacy of practical reason and the necessary fulfilment of its postulates—the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

These moral proofs have won for Kant many adherents, on account of their religious importance and the ease with which they are comprehended ; but, owing to their apparent inconsistency with the results of the first *Critique*, they have found antagonists as well, who have made them the subject now of honest criticism, now of ridicule. It has been asserted that Kant sought in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, but with weak arguments, to raise up again as a makeshift for weak souls what he had already destroyed, and with conclusive argument, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Among the writers on the Critical philosophy, Schopenhauer, in particular, is the representative of this view, and the most pronounced opponent of Kantian theism.

The doctrine of freedom and the absolute supremacy of the moral order of the world, or the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, rests with Kant upon firm ground. The moral proof for the existence of God stands or falls with this doctrine. Regarding the *theoretical* demonstrability of God's existence, Kant held different views at different stages of his philosophical inquiry. In his pre-Critical period he sought to restate these proofs and give them new cogency, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he not only denied, but refuted them, or demonstrated their impossibility, and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, as well as in that of *Teleological Judgment*, he neither abandons nor modifies this last position, but, in perfect agreement with it, deduces—using the well-known and evident arguments—from the necessity of the moral order of the world, the necessity of the moral ground of the world, or the existence of God. Accordingly, in what concerns the question of the *demonstrability* of the divine existence, we find no contradiction in the different views of Kant, but a logically consistent advance. But however differently he may have thought on this point—namely, the *knowableness* of God—there was not a moment in the course of the development of his philosophical convictions when he denied, or even only doubted, the *reality* of God. And there is still a second and a third point which remained unquestionably

certain to him, and even at the time of his most sceptical tendency, when he ridiculed Swedenborg's dreams of a spirit-world and of our intercourse with it I mean his conviction that morality is *independent* of every sort of scientific knowledge, as well as of every doubt that may shake the latter, and that the spiritual world as well as spiritual intercourse consists merely in a *moral* community, or in the moral order of the world ¹

2 *The Kantian Doctrine of Immortality*

On the other hand, the way in which the *summum bonum* is conceived in the *Critique of Practical Reason*—the notion of it being produced with the aid of the Ideas of God and immortality—involves a series of difficult and doubtful considerations. And it will be advisable, in order to gain a correct apprehension of the matter, that we take up our criticism of this doctrine of Kant's along with its characterization. For, since the Critical philosophy sees itself necessitated from the standpoint of its entirely new view of the world to affirm immortality, it is all-important that this affirmation be properly understood.

The *summum bonum* is recognised by Kant as the unification of virtue and happiness, as that state of blessedness which is

¹ Cf K. Fischer *Gesch d n Philos*, vol iii, pp 229, 230, 252-254, 264, 265.

merited by our worthiness, and appointed us by the justice of God. It is because the purity of the will must be attained, and yet cannot be attained in this our present life, that the *Critique of Practical Reason* postulates a future life, i.e., the continuance and permanence of our personal existence, or the immortality of the soul. We will test this conception of the matter exactly according to the canons which the Critical philosophy prescribes for us.

In the first place, it is not at all clear why purity of disposition should be absolutely unattainable during our earthly existence. In reality, Kant has himself contradicted this assertion in his doctrine of religion. For he there exempts from these conditions not merely the ideal Saviour, but the historical person Jesus, expressly declaring that His example would not be practical and effectual if this purity should be either denied Him or ascribed to Him as a supernatural, miraculous power.¹ Hence the proposition that the goal of our moral perfection can be attained *only* in a future and eternal life does not stand proof.

This objection aside, it is further not evident in what respect the *permanence* of our existence is to help the matter. Permanence, like duration in general, is a time-determination, and as

¹ Cf. K. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iv., pp. 309, 310, 321, 322.

such it falls within time and the sense-world. If, now, moral perfection is not attainable in the present sense-world, owing to the temporal and sensible nature of our existence, then it will remain unattainable in the future sense-world, since the conditions of its impossibility are in no way removed. The eternal life must be distinguished from the temporal: even endless existence is not to be regarded as eternal life. And it is much to be regretted that Kant in his doctrine of immortality did *not* make this distinction. He demands "an *existence* and personality of the same rational being enduring to *infinity*."

But if immortality is recognised as continued existence or *future* life, we must ask · *How* can our personality still continue within time and the sense-world after our bodily existence has ceased? By a second earthly birth (transmigration of souls), or by removal to another, perhaps less dense, planet, as Jupiter, for example—what Kant himself in earlier life held to be possible¹—or by wandering through the starry heavens, or how else? Such questions present themselves, and yet they admit of no answer, or only a fanciful one; so that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, considered as a *lasting duration* of our personal existence in time and in the sense-world, is degraded

¹ Cf. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii., p. 148.

from a postulate of practical reason to an object of imagination and phantasy.

According to the demands of practical reason, our worthiness is to be the cause of our happiness, our purity that of our salvation. If we have attained the first we have merited the second, and receive it from the hand of God. Now, we fail to see what sort of happiness that does not follow of itself from purity is still to be added. Self-denial is complete, all motives of self-love and self-seeking are subdued, and thus all the evils which make us unhappy have vanished. The pangs of an evil conscience have given place to the peace of a good one. If this blessedness still lacks anything, it can only be the fulness of *outward* goods, as compensation for the outward evils suffered—it seeming, perhaps, that after achieving the heaven of a good conscience we ought also, speaking in figure, to revel in Abraham's bosom! It is not clear with what right Kant, who in his doctrine of morals maintained and emphatically insisted upon the most rigid and even painful separation of morality and happiness, now demands, in order to the production of the *summum bonum*, the necessary unification of the two under the constant presupposition of their *fundamentally different* origin. Morality follows from the pure will, striving for happiness from the empirical will or self-love, which desires everything that pro-

motes its well-being Is, then, striving for future and eternal happiness less eudæmonistic, less covetous and selfish, than striving for present happiness? Kant's teaching says Seek thou before everything purity of disposition, and happiness shall fall to thee of itself in virtue of divine justice Thou shalt not desire and demand happiness, but thou mayst indeed *hope* for it As though this hope were not, too, a silent expectancy, covetousness, and requisition! With such a hope we are much like the polite servants, who demand nothing, even assure you they will take nothing, yet at the same time furtively open the hand

All these weak points in the Kantian doctrine of immortality, as they present themselves to us in the postulates of practical reason, may be traced to *one* fundamental error The *πρώτον ψεύδος* lies in the fact that divine justice is apprehended after the standard of *temporal* justice, and made to consist in *retribution*. Accordingly, the disproportion between virtue and happiness in our present life demands an equalization which can and should be first realised in a future state Kant established penal justice, the administration of which belongs to the power of the State, on the notion of the necessity of retribution On the same notion he now founds a reward-dispensing justice, the perfect and infallible administration of which is only possible through God, and first exercised in the life beyond. He thus degrades

eternal life to a future life, immortality to a mere permanence of personality, makes purity tantamount to a goal which is absolutely unattainable in the present, and the moral life to a series of states of perfection with which the states of recompense go hand in hand. (Following this view, it must be demanded, as Emil Arnoldt has already aptly remarked,¹ that the degree of happiness be adapted and proportioned to the moral quality of our will, hence that the impurity of the will be accompanied with the corresponding punishments.) And, as a will not completely purified has still the character of impurity, divine justice would be compelled to exercise its office of retribution in the other world chiefly by inflicting greater or less penalties, which would be appointed us according to the greater or less degree of our impurity. In this way we find ourselves in the midst of the labyrinth of the Platonic doctrines of immortality and retribution, while following the threads of the Kantian.

It is further not evident why, in our present life, the justice of God as granting rewards, and, in the future life, as inflicting penalties, should in each case cease or be suspended, which we are led to infer, since Kant scarcely mentions the latter in his doctrine of immortality. Why are the countless inequalities

¹ E. Arnoldt : *Ueber Kant's Ideen vom höchsten Gut.* (Königsberg, 1874), pp. 7-13.

between virtue and happiness permitted even in this world—if they actually are, indeed, the inequalities which they seem to us to be? If they are not, as the omnipresence and justice of God compel us to believe, then even those conditions disappear under which divine justice is to assume first in a *future* life the office and character of an equalizing retribution.

Kant wanted to harmonize his new doctrine of freedom with the old doctrine of immortality and of retribution in a future world, and he sought to do this by recognizing and defending the latter as a necessary postulate of the former. This attempt must necessarily have failed, and, indeed, have been frustrated by the principles of the Critical philosophy itself. If the activity of God remains for us an unsearchable mystery, as Kant taught and must have taught, then he could not consistently have attempted to unveil the *mode of activity* of the divine justice, and have sought to determine it according to a standard that is subject to the conditions of time. And even saying nothing of the fact that he unjustifiably apprehended this *mode of activity* as retribution, and permitted it to appear as something comprehensible, he still was not justified in representing this divine retribution as inoperative in the present temporal state, and as first to be looked for in the future life.

Our aim is to judge the Kantian doctrine of immortality

according to the fundamental canons of the Critical philosophy, and we desire, therefore, to amend it in agreement with them, not to reject it altogether. For we certainly appreciate that the new doctrine of freedom radically changes the doctrine of immortality also, and that the latter enters through Transcendental Idealism a new stadium of *affirmation*. Now, the apprehension as well as the determination of the problem of immortality depends upon the question whether we, with all that constitutes our being, are in time and space, or these in us. If time and space are the all-comprehensive, fundamental conditions of all ⁺existence, so that nothing can be independent of them, then it is matter alone which persists, while its forms ? change; then all particular things must originate and pass away; then no single being, no individual, hence also no person, can perpetually endure; on the contrary, each one has a definite duration in time which is so bound up with his being that the limits of this duration are the insurmountable limits of personal existence. Under this presupposition, according to which time and space are things, or determinations of *things-in-themselves*, there remains nothing further for us than either, in agreement with the above assumption, to deny every sort of individual (personal) immortality, or, in contradiction to it, to affirm and conceive of the latter in a wholly fanciful manner, merely to

what sort of language? phenomenal? - they can be the conditions of the thing
- i.e. - the conditions of the thing - the conditions of the thing

satisfy certain needs of the inner nature All origination and decay take place in time, and are only possible in time. What-ever is wholly independent of time, or has the character of time-less being, can neither originate nor pass away this alone is *eternal* Since, now, time as such is no thing-in-itself, but only the necessary form of thought, all things in time are ideas or phenomena, which depend for their existence upon a being to whom they appear, or who conceives and knows them This being, however, since it constitutes the condition of all phe-nomena, is itself no phenomenon, it is not in time, but time in it, hence it is independent of all time—i.e., timeless, or *eternal*. It is impossible that certain phenomena should originate, and then, instead of passing away, continue to exist *ad infinitum* It is just as impossible that certain phenomena should pass away, and yet, instead of actually perishing, continue to exist in time and the sense-world in some secret manner Yet this is the way in which the immortality of the human soul is commonly conceived—namely, the perishableness of human existence in time is at once affirmed and denied, and death thus regarded in reality as a mere formality.

The true notion of immortality coincides with that of *eternity*. Such immortality the Critical philosophy affirms and establishes through its new doctrines of time and space, of the ideality of our

sense-world, and of the reality of that supersensible substratum which lies at the basis of our theoretical reason and its phenomena, and which Kant called "thing-in-itself," and exhibited as the principle of the moral order of the world. Now, just as all objects of sense are throughout phenomenal so also our sense-life has the character of a pure phenomenon; and just as the entire sense-world is the manifestation of the intelligible or moral order of the world, so the empirical character of man is the manifestation of his intelligible character; that is temporal and transitory, this timeless and eternal. The eternity of our intelligible being must, like freedom, be affirmed, although immortality, as thus truly apprehended, cannot be represented to the mind, or drawn in the imagination, since to conceive it, or to fashion it pictorially, means to make it temporal and therewith to deny it altogether. Since without sensuous ideas there are no knowable objects, the immortality of the soul can never be theoretically demonstrated. But since all sensuous ideas stand under the condition of time, which is itself merely the form of our thought, our being is timeless or eternal, and the immortality of the soul can never be refuted; all proofs directed against the doctrine are just as futile as the *theoretical* arguments for it. On either side, the reality of time, and what is really tantamount to the mortality of our being, are first falsely assumed: and then the one, in

order to establish the immortality of the soul, demonstrates its immateriality and indestructibility, while the other, in order to refute the same proposition, proves the soul's materiality and perishability. Invalid proofs may be confuted by showing their impossibility, but they cannot be nullified by demonstrating the opposite position with proofs which are equally invalid. Hence opponents are not to be driven out of the field by demonstrations of immortality. But one may, indeed, and without overstepping the bounds of a proper use of reason, oppose to them an *hypothesis* which they cannot refute, and which itself makes no claim to be theoretically demonstrable. "The Doctrine of Methods" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* contains, in its section on the "Discipline of Pure Reason in reference to Hypotheses," a most noteworthy and characteristic passage, in which Kant commends to his adherents the doctrine of immortality in just such an hypothetical form, in order that they may make use of it in opposing their antagonists. "If, then," he says, "as opposing itself to the assumed (in any but a speculative connection) nature of the soul, as being something immaterial and not subject to bodily transformations, you should meet with the difficulty of the argument, that experience, nevertheless, seems to show that both the increased capacity and the derangement of our mental powers are merely different modifications of our organs, you can weaken

the force of this proof by assuming that our bodies are nothing but the *fundamental phenomenon*, to which as condition the entire faculty of sense, and herewith all thought, refers itself in the present state (life). The separation from the body would then be the end of this sensible use of your faculty of knowledge, and the beginning of the intellectual. The body would consequently not be the cause of thought, but merely an impeding condition of it, and hence to be regarded, indeed, as a furthering of sensible and animal life, but yet just in such measure as also a hindrance to pure, spiritual life. Thus the dependence of the animal life upon the bodily constitution proves nothing as to the dependence of the mental life upon the state of our organs. But you might go even farther and trace out some new query, which has been as yet either unsuggested or not sufficiently pursued. The fortuity of generation, for example—depending, as it does, with man as well as with the non-rational creatures, upon circumstance, and even upon sustenance, upon the conduct of life, its humours and caprices, and often indeed upon vice—throws a great difficulty in the way of the notion of the lasting existence of a creature whose life began under such trifling and contingent circumstances. This difficulty, however, has little to do with the question of the permanence (here upon earth) of the whole race, since the contingency in individual

cases is nevertheless on that account subject to general rule. But to expect in reference to every individual such a far-reaching effect from so insignificant conditions, seems certainly questionable. But in opposition to this query you could offer a transcendental hypothesis, that all life is strictly speaking only intelligible; that it is not subject to time-mutations; that it neither has a beginning in birth, nor will find an end in death; *that this life is nothing but a pure phenomenon—i.e., a sensuous idea of the pure, spiritual life*; that the entire sense-world is merely an image, which hovers before us on account of our present faculty of knowledge, and which, like a dream, has no objective reality in itself; that if we were to perceive ourselves and things as they *are*, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our only true intercourse with which neither began at birth, nor will cease with the death of the body (as mere phenomenon). Now, although we do not *know* the least thing of all this which we here offer as a defence against our opponents, nor even maintain it in earnest—it is all by no means an Idea of the reason, but merely a notion thought out as a weapon of defence—we are, nevertheless, proceeding in strict accordance with reason, since we only show the opponent, who thinks to have exhausted all the possibilities of the matter by erroneously declaring that the want of its empirical conditions is a proof of

the perfect impossibility of what is believed by us, that he can just as little span, by the mere laws of experience, the entire field of possible things considered in themselves, as we outside of experience can achieve anything in a well-founded way for our reason. Whoever resorts to such hypothetical remedies for the assumptions of an over-confident disputant must not be held responsible for them, as if they were his own real opinions. He abandons them as soon as he has silenced the dogmatic presumption of his antagonist. For, however modest and moderate it certainly is, when one merely objects to or disagrees with the views of another, it always becomes, just as soon as one would have his objections recognized as proofs of the opposite, a no less arrogant and presuming claim than if he had made a direct attack upon the position of the affirmative party.”¹

It will not be difficult to determine in this hypothesis regarding immortality what is to be ascribed to the *theoretical* mode of conception and the method of Kant, and what to be regarded as his own most inward conviction. Conviction it plainly is—based upon the new doctrine of the ideality of time and the sense-world—that our sense-life has the character of a mere

¹ Kant : *Kr. d. r. Vernunft. Methodenlehre*, Part I, sec. 3. (*Werke*, vol. ii. pp. 583-585.) Cf. Fischer : *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii., pp. 530, 531.

phenomenon, and that our intelligible being is independent of all time, hence timeless and free, eternal and immortal. If the sense-world were nothing but a dream that floated before us, or a scene which we contemplated like a theatrical performance, then it is self-evident that we should survive this passive state of imagination, for the end of the dream is not that of the dreamer, nor the end of the play that of the spectator. But the matter is not so simple. We are not only perceptive of the sense-world, but active in it, not merely spectators in the world's theatre, but actors as well. In other words, the world has no place for spectators but the stage; this is the scene where we live and act, where we appear as performers, and at the same time contemplate and recognize our own performance. Here, accordingly, actor and spectator are in so far one that, when the looker-on ceases to be a performer, he also ceases to be a looker-on. With our existence in the world of sense, our contemplation of things, and even the appearance of things, vanishes. With our sense-life our sensuous thought perishes, and together with it that knowledge the fundamental forms of which are space and time. Corresponding to our timeless being there is the state of timeless knowing, or of that intellectual perception which has immediate knowledge of the inner nature of things. It is this organ of knowledge which Kant means when, in the

passage cited above, he sanctions the assertion that "our body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to which, as condition, the entire faculty of sense, and herewith all thinking, relates itself in the present state," that "the separation from the body is the end of the sensible use of our faculty of knowledge and the beginning of the intellectual," and that "If we were to perceive ourselves and things as they are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures" If, now, timeless knowing can belong, as Kant elsewhere teaches,¹ only to the Primitive Being, then the end of our sensible existence is to be regarded as a return to God, and our eternal or purely spiritual life as a life in God. With sensuous thought all sensuous appetites must have disappeared, and thereby that need of purification, on account of which Kant in his practical doctrine of immortality demanded the endless duration of our personal existence. Then purity would not constitute the problem and goal, but the condition and character of immortal life Schopenhauer rejects, along with the Kantian theism, the doctrine of immortality which is expounded in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, as coinciding with the doctrine of retribution He affirms the immortality of our being on the ground of the *Transcendental*

¹ Cf *supra*, The Thing-in-itself

~~Æsthetic~~. He says: "Did one wish to demand, as has so often happened, the permanence of individual consciousness, in order to couple with it reward or punishment in a future world, it would in fact be only a question of the compatibility of virtue and selfishness. But these two will never embrace each other, they are diametrical opposites." "The adequate answer to the question of the permanence of the individual after death lies in Kant's great doctrine of the *ideality of time*, which proves itself just here especially fruitful, since, by a thoroughly theoretical, yet well elucidated insight, it makes compensation for dogmas, which lead on the one hand as well as on the other to absurdities, and thus at a stroke does away with the most prolific of all metaphysical questions. Beginning, end, permanence, are notions which borrow their significance solely from time, and consequently are valid only under the presupposition of the latter. But time has no absolute existence, nor is it the sort or mode of being *per se* of things, but merely the form of our *knowledge* of our own existence and of that of all things, and precisely on that account it is very incomplete, and limited to mere phenomena."¹

Since, now, it is absolutely impossible for our reason as at present constituted to form for itself an idea of the state of

¹ A. Schopenhauer *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. II, fifth edition, p. 564. Cf. his *Parerga und Paralipomena*, vol. II, fourth edition, § 137.

timeless being and knowing, we must conclude that we cannot know anything in the least of the life after death. It is desirable to note, therefore, that Kant expressly declares that this hypothesis is not intended to defend the dogma of immortality, but only to combat the opponents of the dogma. Yet it remains very noteworthy that Kant chose, as best illustrating the "hypotheses of pure reason" which he permitted and justified for polemical use, precisely this doctrine—the doctrine, namely, which exhibits our present existence as a mere phenomenon or sensuous idea of our eternal and intelligible life. If we compare the Kantian doctrine of immortality as expressed in this hypothesis of pure reason with the same doctrine as a postulate of the practical reason, we see that eternal life is there conceived as timeless, supersensible, and purely spiritual; here, on the contrary, as temporal, hence sensible, and needing purification; there it is regarded as completion, which we are to conceive as a life in God; here, on the other hand, as an endless process of moral purification, subject to divine retribution. According to the first conception, our eternal life is independent of time and space. What is called the state of the soul after death is, for our present faculty of knowledge, *mysterium magnum*. And "the tiresome query: *When? Where? and How?*" is herewith forever silenced, since it is now senseless and absurd, seeking

timeless and spaceless existence in time and space. But, according to the second conception, the soul is to continue its existence after death, is to experience a series of progressive states of purification, hence is to live on in time and the sense-world; at a definite period of time it must leave the body, seek a new place of abode, take on a new form of life; and since all this can only take place in space and time, in the every-day world about us, might it not seem that, with ordinary sagacity, we ought to be able to detect its hidden way? The *knowledge* that the great Beyond must ever remain an unfathomable mystery to us is now no longer our possession, and we stand helpless, like Mephistopheles before the corpse of Faust:

“Und wenn ich Tag und Stunden mich zerplage,
Wann? Wie? und Wo? das ist die leidige Frage.”

“And though I fret and worry till I’m weary,
When? How? and Where? remains the fatal query.”

—TAYLOR’S *Translation*.

CHAPTER III.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS DOCTRINE OF DEVELOPMENT.

I. KANT'S FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS.

THE fact that we conceive a common world of sense is the first problem; its solution constituted the theme of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge. If this world of sense were not completely phenomenal, *i.e.*, conceivable and conceived, that fact would necessarily have been recognized as inexplicable. Objects of sense are appearances or phenomena. In order to explain the latter, three questions have to be answered, which virtually involve Kant's fundamental problems. Firstly, there must be a subject, to which anything objective could in general appear, and without which no sort of phenomenon would be possible. The question is: *Who* (what) is the knowing subject? Secondly, there must be an *essence*, which constitutes the ground of phenomena, and of the knowing subject itself, provided the latter does not create out of itself the things it conceives. In

this case the knowing subject would at the same time be the ground of being of all phenomena. But since this is not the case, it must be asked: *What* is the substratum which is the ground of the knowing subject as well as of the entire phenomenal world? Thirdly, between this substantial ground and everything based upon it there must subsist a relation which determines the nature of the forms and objects of knowledge (phenomena) peculiar to us, and which, if it lie within our comprehension, explains them. The question is: *Why* the nature of our knowledge, and the nature of things, are constituted as they are, and not otherwise? The three problems may be summarily designated by the initial words: Who? What? Why?

The first question is solved by the *Critique of Pure Reason* through its investigation of our faculties of knowledge, and through its doctrine that the sense-world originates from the material elements of our impressions and the formative elements of our perceptions and notions. The second question Kant answered by his differentiation of phenomena from things-in-themselves. What the latter are, the *Critique of Practical Reason* shows by its doctrine of freedom and the moral order of the world, and the cognate doctrines of God and immortality. The third question is regarded by Kant as incapable of solution,

owing to the constitution of the human faculties of knowledge. If the relation of things-in-themselves and phenomena were an intelligible relation, the first cause of things, and therefore their primal origin, the timeless creation, would be known, and the riddle of the world solved. But this relation remains unknowable, the inner nature of things unsearchable, the mystery of the world still a mystery. Of these unsolvable problems there are three: the cosmological, the psychological, and the theological.

If the intelligible character of the world consists in freedom, then it is the *Will* which determines the peculiar constitution of our knowing sensuous reason, as well as the peculiar nature of phenomena, and upon which they both depend. *How* this is possible is the question which holds the secret of the world. Kant rightly grasped and rightly stated this question, but he declared an answer to it to be impossible. Schopenhauer claims the honour of having found the only true answer, and of having solved by his own doctrine the problem which Kant merely discovered.

The psychological and theological problems are subordinate to, rather than co-ordinate with, the cosmological, since they contain the same problem applied in the one case to human reason, and in the other to human character. The psychological problem is concerned with the nature of our knowing faculties,

in the constitution of which sense and understanding are at once distinguished and united, as is indicated in Kant's question: "How is external perception—namely, that of space—in a thinking subject in general possible?" If we call the thinking subject "soul," and its outward manifestation "body," the psychological problem involves, in this its true conception, the old inquiry concerning the relation of body and soul. The theological problem deals with the fact of our moral disposition, with the relation of our intelligible to our empirical character, or with the way in which freedom and necessity consist together and are united in our moral conduct. All these questions Kant held that it was impossible to answer with the means of our *theoretical* or scientific knowledge.

The fundamental inquiry has to do with the relation between things-in-themselves and phenomena, or, what is the same thing, the relation between freedom and nature, between the intelligible and the sensible, the moral and the material orders of the world, or between the causality of will and mechanical causality. The unification of both lies in the principle of natural adaptation, and the teleological view of the world based upon it—a view which by no means lays claim to the validity of scientific (theoretical) knowledge—yet claims, nevertheless, the character of a necessary and indispensable principle of judgment. But the idea

of immanent ends in nature is so intimately connected with the idea of natural development that the two are inseparable. That which develops itself must develop itself to something, *i.e.*, self-development implies the necessary actualization of an inherent end; and whatever has such an inherent end, or implanted tendency, which strives for realization, must, in the very nature of things, develop itself. In the notion of natural development, therefore, final and mechanical causality, will and mechanism, freedom and nature, thing-in-itself and phenomenon, unite themselves. We accordingly take Kant's doctrine of development as the unification of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom.

II. THE WORLD VIEWED AS AN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

1. *The Natural Development.*

If we compare the pre-Critical inquiries of our philosopher with the *Critique of Pure Reason* and with the views that grow out of it, we find one fundamental thought running through the ideas of both periods; it is Kant's view of the world as an *historical development*—a view which was by no means contradicted nor prejudiced by the *Critique*, but, in fact, more firmly established than had been possible before it. Since the subject of this view of the world is nothing other than the natural cosmic changes, or the succession in time of the different states of the world (which are

connected according to the law of causality, so that the later necessarily follow from the earlier), the development of things coincides with their *natural history*, which is something entirely different from the customary *description* of nature. This contents itself with artificially classifying things, with grouping their external attributes, and with describing *what* they are in their present state. Natural history, on the other hand, explains *how* things originated and have become what they are, what changes and transformations they have undergone in the course of time, how and under what conditions the present states have grown out of the previous ones. Such a natural history of the world Kant missed in the scientific knowledge he found at hand, and he demanded that it be attempted as a new and bold problem, the solution of which must be ventured. He himself led the way by his own example, founding with his *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* this new scientific account of the world. His short geological treatises, together with his *Physical Geography*, may be regarded as contributions to the natural history of the earth, while his two treatises on the human races are rightly designed to be contributions to the natural history of man. "It is *true philosophy*," said Kant, "to trace the diverse forms of a thing through all its history."¹

¹ Kant: *Physische Geographie*, Introduction, § 4. Part II, Sec. I., § 3.

2. The Intellectual Development.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* teaches how phenomena, the sense-world, and experience originate from the conditions of our representative nature, how experience grows and becomes increased, and how it systematises itself, as in accordance with the regulative Ideas of reason it strives toward a scientific system of knowledge, the final goal of which, were it attainable, could be nothing other than the completely intelligible *system of development* of the world. If we follow out the investigations of the *Critique* in the development and progress of its results, and see how it makes phenomena or objects originate from our sensations and the form-giving capacities of our perception and thought, and experience originate from the synthesis of phenomena, and systematised experience, *i.e.*, science in the progressive development of its various departments, or the *history* of the sciences, originate from the co-ordination of experiences in accordance with the regulative Ideas, we see that the problem and results of the *Critique* cannot be more concisely and aptly summed up than in the designation we have chosen: it is the doctrine of the origin and development of human knowledge. In every development the stadium reached is always in its completion the condition, the material, the beginning of a higher

form. This is also true of our states of knowledge. Impressions are the material out of which phenomena are formed, phenomena the material for experience, completed experiences the material of actual experimental knowledge. Thus the states of knowledge, the origin of which the *Critique* teaches, are the *states of development* of knowledge.

3. *The Social Development and the Development of Culture.*

The natural history of man is the condition and the material of the history of his freedom. The natural and intellectual development serves the moral, which does not merely, so to say, continue the former on a higher plane, but subordinates it and makes its development subservient to its own. The progressive development of our natural and intellectual capacities shows itself, in this service of freedom, as human *civilization*, or as the history of culture; and the nature of civilization is, according to the view of Kant, such that it is involuntarily impelled forward from the natural ends and interests of man to the fulfilment of the law of freedom, but it is completed only by the Idea of freedom itself. Moral freedom can only develop itself as historical culture, and the history of culture can complete itself only when its highest goal is striven for with the clearest knowledge and purpose. Then the laws of freedom will not be

blindly fulfilled, but fulfilled *with freedom*. In order that the capacities of human nature receive full development and attain their natural ends, the antagonism of interests, the competition of ability, the division of labour, discord and the struggle for existence, must enter into life; there must be an advancement from the isolated state of life to the social, and from barbaric freedom to social and civil freedom, where the conflict of interests, to be sure, continues, and, with the increase of our wants, becomes more complex and more intense, but without that reciprocal destructiveness and the endangering of existence and freedom. For the *full* unfolding of capacities is only possible under the condition of the *security* of life. Security belongs to the natural ends of life, hence social union and public law and order must be sought and attained in the highest form possible. That form is the *constitutional government*. But even the constitutional state remains insecure, as well as the existence of all individuals and the development of all interests of culture, as long as states and peoples still exist in a condition of barbaric freedom, warring with each other to their mutual destruction. Consequently the natural ends of life, or the needs which man has for security, demand not only a civil, but an *international law*, the most secure form of which is a federation of free, civilised, and constitutionally governed peoples.

4. The Moral and Religious Development.

But freedom is only actualised and, as it were, embodied in a moral state of the world, when it is striven for, not on account of the security of life, but for freedom's *own sake*, and with those means which are the factors of freedom itself: these are, not the "mechanism of our inclinations," but conscious purpose, ethical knowledge, and moral character. Kant, accordingly, demanded that the necessity of a confederation of nations, with a view to establishing lasting peace, should not be urged merely in the interests of security and civilisation, but that it should be placed upon moral grounds, and held up to view as the moral end of the world, and that in this spirit of world-citizenship the universal history of man should be written. In order to show that "the evolution of a form of government based upon natural right" lay in the plan of the world's history, and that its time had come, Kant appealed to the enthusiasm and intense interest with which all civilised nations greeted the attempt of the French to found a government of natural rights. And in his own epoch he saw the rise of Individualism in thought and knowledge—"the age of enlightenment," the goal of which could be nothing other than an intellectually and morally enlightened period,

whose culture should be permeated through and through with the Idea of freedom.

But the moral development by no means goes hand in hand with the progress of our culture and our external civilization. On the contrary, the more complex human society becomes, the more it suffers internal disruption the more it develops the inequality of individuals in the circumstances of life, the more it arouses and fosters motives of self-seeking, and allows contention and hateful and evil passions, these "offspring of lawless dispositions," to grow without bounds. It is because such enormous vices as ingratitude and hatred, jealousy and malicious pleasure, ill-will and calumny, flourish and luxuriate in the very bosom of society, that the latter needs to be transformed and purified in its very core, needs a complete regeneration, which not "the juridical," but only "the ethical state," hence not the State, but only the *Church*, as the moral kingdom of God on earth, is capable of effecting. Here the sinful natures, out of which all those evils spring that men intentionally bring upon one another, are to be rooted out, and men's hearts purified, in order that good-will may reign in the world. The establishment of such a kingdom of God upon earth is necessary for the solution of that most important of all problems—*man's salvation*, and it is consequently recognized by Kant as a duty of mankind to

itself, and in this respect as *sui generis*. The fulfilment of this duty constitutes the special theme of the *religious development*, the true problem and goal of which first found its historical expression in the appearance of Christianity, and which needed in the growth of the visible Church constant rectification, in order that it should not become fixed in outward, lifeless forms, and the real essence be lost sight of. To true faith there belongs that veracity which is identical with sincere conviction based upon moral self-knowledge. Nothing conflicts with religious belief more than hypocrisy, and hypocrisy is the offspring and companion of compulsory faith. Hence Kant regarded the religious *Aufklärung*, owing to its principle of tolerance, as an essential feature of the *Aufklärung* itself, and its epoch as a necessary stage of reform in the history of the Church.

The manner in which Kant apprehended the relation of religion and revelation, of the invisible and the visible Church, may serve as an excellent illustration of his doctrine of development in general. He, like Lessing, regarded revelation as the religious education of mankind, the visible Church as the form of manifestation and development of the invisible; and he laid great stress upon the just appreciation of these historical, formative stages, since it is quite as mistaken to consider them

worthless and superfluous as to hold them to be the essence of religion, or its immutable forms. And just as the visible Church is related to the invisible, so our natural and social history is related to freedom and the final moral end of man, and our sense-life to our intelligible being, and the sensible world to the moral.

III. THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD.

1. *The World-development as Phenomenon.*

We see how the Kantian philosophy presents itself, in its entire view of the world, as *Doctrine of Development*. It regards nature and freedom, culture and the state, religion and the church, as historical developments; and, although it has not developed these subjects, but only sketched their main features and general outline, yet it had already seized upon the problem of such a view of the world before the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and has established it by means of the latter.

The laws of world-development are partly laws of nature, partly laws of freedom. The first consist in the laws of motion of the material world, in the causality of objective and subjective changes, in the necessary succession in time of the different states of the world; the second consist in the moral end of reason, from which follow those objective and subjective laws

of freedom which are to be fulfilled in the development of culture and of the State, of religion and of the Church.

In the pre-Critical period, Kant's views of development were confined to natural history, and especially to the mechanical origin and transformations of the cosmos. Nevertheless, he declared even at this time, that the origin of *organic* bodies could not be comprehended after mere mechanical laws. The inquiry concerning the *knowableness* of natural changes, or of the causal nexus of things, lay still remote from him when, in his *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, he set forth his mechanical cosmogony. He took the world and its laws as given, and left unconsidered the way in which they become known to us. The thorough investigation of this question, which concerns the causal nexus of things, necessitated him first to abandon rationalism, then also the old-school empiricism, and to set out upon the entirely new path of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This brought the solution: it discovered how, in accordance with the constitution of our reason, phenomena, and their necessary synthesis—the sense-world as constituted by natural law (nature), originate out of the material of our impressions and the laws of our thought (sense and understanding). We are obliged by the nature and laws of our reason to conceive the material universe in a mechanical development, the realm of

animal life in an organic development, and mankind in a moral development. And, since all these orders of development contain nothing that might not be conceivable and conceived, the entire world-development is through and through phenomenal. Its laws are laws of nature and of freedom ; both are necessary ideas of our reason ; those condition the sensible, these the moral experience. Hence, also, the history of nature and freedom, *i.e.*, the entire world-development, has the character of idea or phenomenon. And what else could it be, since all stages of evolution, of whatever sort they may be, are successive, or constitute a *time-succession*, hence must take place in time, which, as a pure form of thought, can itself contain only ideas or phenomena ?

2. *The World-development as Teleological Phenomenon.*

The notion of phenomenon, however, is necessarily grasped much more adequately in the doctrine of development than in doctrine of knowledge. As objects of our experience or scientific knowledge, phenomena may not be referred to *ends* ; as forms of development, on the contrary, they cannot be conceived apart from ends. Whatever evolves itself must evolve itself into something ; it bears its own determination within itself, and manifests the character of self-determination and freedom. If

we compare phenomenon as object of knowledge with phenomenon as stage of development, we see that the difference lies in the conception of *immanent teleology*, which is excluded in the former and comprehended in the latter. And, indeed, the idea of inherent, final causes as operative in phenomena must be applied to the entire world-development; not merely to the organic and moral development, but also to the mechanical. In the organic development the notion of ends is a necessary principle of our judgment, since living bodies are *ipso facto* those which develop or organize *themselves*, and are consequently inconceivable without the Idea of inherent ends. In the moral development the notion of ends acts as the necessary principle, not only of our judgment, but also of our conduct and the outward manifestations of our character, since the will acts in accordance with ends, and the moral character of its acts is both determined and judged by the moral law. In the moral world ends have *real*, in the organic, *ideal*, validity; in the mechanical world they are to have *no* validity whatever! According to the doctrine of Kant, there is but *one* time and *one* space, and therefore only *one* sense-world, or one universal nexus of all phenomena. If, now, some phenomena show themselves to be determined by ends, and others must be teleologically judged, there certainly can be no phenomena that

are wholly without end. For the moral development of mankind is also organic, and without its organic-sensuous character it would not be *development* at all; and organic bodies are material and mechanical as well. Consequently the inorganic bodies also, although they must be explained independently of the notion of ends, cannot yet be without end, else there would be no universal nexus of phenomena, no unity of the sense-world, no unity of time and of space, by which we understand, not a closed unity in the sense of totality, but a world-unity, as opposed to those numberless independent worlds assumed by Leibnitz, and also accepted by Kant in his first studies—afterwards, however, reckoned, together with the *Monadology*, among “the legends from the Utopia of Metaphysics.” Our view of the world advances from the lifeless realm to the living, and from the living to the moral; that is, it sees how the organic world evolves from the inorganic, and how humanity and the moral world evolve from the organic world. And this view would fall to the ground if it should deny the validity of ends in the first stadium of evolution, and then in the second be obliged to acknowledge their necessary application, and, finally, in the third, discover their reality. But this is not the view expressed in the Kantian doctrine. The latter denies, not the validity of ends, but their theoretical or scientific knowableness in both the

inorganic and organic worlds. It affirms their knowableness in the moral world, because here the activity of ends is immediately apparent from the will itself. Matter renders ends unknowable; the will, on the contrary, knowable. Ends are immanent causes, but matter is spatial, and, like space, completely external; everything in space exists as externality, and consists in outward relations; hence it contains no sort of *knowable* immanent causes. This is true of phenomena in general; hence of all bodies, even the organic, which oblige us to consider them as controlled by ends, simply because they produce, form, and reproduce themselves, *i.e.*, because they *develop themselves*.

The unity of the world is also the unity of the world-development. Consequently the *end* that reveals itself in the moral order of things and gives them their intelligible meaning must also be recognized as the *principle* that underlies the natural order of things, but presents itself as knowable in no natural phenomena. That end is freedom. Accordingly, we must consider the entire world-development as the *manifestation of freedom*, and the sensible order of the world as the manifestation of the moral. We thus rise to a point of view where the inner nature of things, which ever remains hidden from our knowledge in its exact sense, becomes unveiled, and where the mystery of the world is solved.

3 *The World development as Manifestation of Thing in itself*

Thus in the Kantian doctrine of development the two other fundamental disciplines of the Critical philosophy—the doctrines of knowledge and freedom, or, what is the same thing, the notions of nature and freedom—are united. The *Critique of Pure Reason* culminates in the teleological point of view, and attains, by working this out, a systematic view of the world. The conclusions we have drawn stand directly in the line of the Kantian doctrine, and they are embodied in expressions which in no way ascribe to Kant or force upon him views that he has not himself expressed or sanctioned in his teaching. For he held both to the unity of the world and to evolution, both to the ideal validity of design in the organic realm and to its real validity in the moral realm, both to freedom as the moral end of the world and to the intelligible character of freedom, and he declared that intelligible character is identical with thing-in itself. Adaptation, of whatever sort it may be, consists in the correspondence of a thing with an end or purpose. This presupposes activity towards an end, hence an end-active power and an end-positing faculty, i.e., will and freedom. Such a correspondence is either given in the thing itself and exists in actuality, or it appears to our reason that it must be present. In the one case it is factual and *real*,

in the other it is only a necessary idea, and therefore merely *ideal*. *Moral* ends are of the first sort, *organic* or *natural* of the second. Since, now, without end or purpose, *i.e.*, without will or freedom, adaptation in general can neither exist nor be conceived, and all development must be considered as teleological, the latter must be recognized as the manifestation of freedom or of thing-in-itself. In other words, while the world-development consists in the natural and moral orders of things, the second is not merely the highest stage of development of the first, but also its *ground*; the sensible world is not merely the temporal presupposition of the moral, but also its *phenomenon*. In short, the entire world-development or world-order is the manifestation of freedom.

That such is in fact the truth of the matter Kant declared in his doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, and confirmed it in the *Critique of Judgment*. He explained that that supersensible substratum of our knowing reason and of all phenomena, "that supersensible upon which we must base nature as phenomenon," is identical with freedom. The literal statement is as follows: "There must, however, be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible, which underlies nature, with that which the notion of freedom practically contains, and even if the notion of this ground leads neither to a theoretical nor a practical knowledge of the same, and hence possesses no particular sphere, yet

it makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one, to that according to the principles of the other."¹ "What the notion of freedom practically contains" is, according to Kant, nothing other than final moral end. What is coincident or one with this can only be the moral end itself, for this is only one, with itself. When, consequently, "the unity of the supersensible which underlies nature, with what the notion of freedom practically contains," is spoken of, that supersensible substratum can be nothing other than the final moral end itself. And when Kant says "there must be a ground of that unity," only the ground of the final moral end can be understood by it; but this is simply and solely *will* or *freedom*. That "supersensible which underlies nature" is, therefore, *will* or *freedom*. There is, according to the letter as well as the spirit of Kant's doctrine, no other issue. Now, of freedom as the final moral end we have no theoretical, but indeed a practical, knowledge. But of freedom as the supersensible substratum of all phenomena we have neither a theoretical nor a practical knowledge, *i.e.*, we can form no sort of an idea of the "ground of the unity of the supersensible which underlies

¹ Kant: *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, Introduction II. (*Werke*, vol. vii., p. 14.)
Id.: *Dialektik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft*, § 78, p. 231. Cf. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iv., pp. 397 and 497.

nature, with what the notion of freedom practically contains." Hence Kant says, there must be such a ground, the character of which permits us to unite the principles of nature with those of freedom, although we can acquire neither a theoretical nor a practical knowledge of this ground. The unification of nature and freedom consists in the notion of natural freedom or adaptation; and all organic phenomena must be considered and estimated in accordance with this principle as criterion. Of natural necessity or the mechanism of things we have a theoretical knowledge, of moral freedom a practical knowledge, of natural freedom no knowledge at all; that is, will or freedom in nature is unknowable; natural ends or final causes must necessarily be conceived, but they can never be known.

All the phenomena of nature are exertions of force: natural freedom consists in the freedom of force; it is the freedom of phenomenon, or the phenomenon in its freedom. Within the natural world this freedom displays itself in self-developing bodies, *i.e.*, in such bodies as bring forth, shape, and reproduce themselves; these are the *living* phenomena of nature, which we are accordingly obliged to conceive of after the principle of objective, immanent teleology. The necessity of regarding organic nature in this way was the subject which Kant worked out in his *Critique of Teleological Judgment*.

There is also the free contemplation of things, where freedom is not our object or problem, but our *state*—that harmonious condition of our powers of mind which does not seek to investigate and analyze phenomena, but leaves them in their freedom, apprehending them with pure contemplative pleasure. To this perfectly free attitude of mind, dependent upon or restrained by no interests, there corresponds the free phenomenon, *i.e.*, the phenomenon in its complete freedom. It is the object of our pure pleasure; we pronounce it beautiful or sublime. Upon this principle of the subjective fitness of phenomena is founded our faculty of æsthetic judgment, which furnished Kant with the theme of his *Critique of the Æsthetic Judgment*. His investigation confined itself to the analysis of our æsthetic judgment, or of our thought in the state of freedom. This needed to be supplemented by a discussion of the correlate of our æsthetic contemplation, namely, *the phenomenon in the state of freedom*, or by the attempt to establish also the objectivity of æsthetic fitness. This supplementary step was taken by Schiller, who, more than any other down to Schopenhauer, furthered and extended the Kantian Æsthetics without abandoning the principles of the Critical philosophy. If freedom is the highest law of reason, and if, as such, it determine the character of our knowledge, the laws of which (the laws of the understanding) condition the sense-

world, then we must necessarily conceive freedom in phenomena also ; and phenomenon in its freedom is beauty. Schiller could not have indicated his Kantian standpoint, and at the same time his advance within it, more aptly and more forcibly than he has done in a word in one of those letters to Körner, which give his chief æsthetic ideas in all their freshness. Even these few words show what a profound understanding of the Critical philosophy he possessed : "Certainly no greater word has yet been spoken by mortal man than the Kantian 'Determine thyself out of thyself' (which is at once the content of his whole philosophy), and this other, of the theoretical philosophy, 'Nature stands under the laws of the understanding.' This great Idea of self-determination is mirrored back to us from certain phenomena of nature, and this we call *Beauty*." ¹

We shall not now ask whether the Kantian doctrines of knowledge and development conflict with one another, but only note that, in the first, things-in-themselves are absolutely unknowable and absolutely distinguished from phenomena, while in the second the *Phenomenon of Freedom* shows itself. With End, will

¹ *Schillers Briefwechsel mit Körner*, 2nd ed., edited by Carl Goedeke, 1878. Letter of the 18th of February, 1793, pp. 18, 19. The letters referred to above are the following five written in Jena : that of January 25th, and those of the 8th, 18th, 23rd, and 28th of February, 1793. *Vide* pp. 5-51.

enters the phenomenal world ; with Will, freedom, intelligible character, or thing-in-itself, and the farther the evolution of things advances, the more distinctly it manifests itself. The world-development is recognized by Kant as the manifestation and ever-increasing revelation of freedom. That which in the mechanical world is not at all manifest or is completely hidden, forces itself already in the organic realm so far to the light that we are not even able perfectly to experience the phenomena of life without the idea of life's inner adaptation to an end ; and in the moral sphere it is completely manifest and present. In the organic evolution of the world we take ends into account ; in the moral, it is the thing itself.

Yet between the two doctrines, as they shaped themselves in the mind of Kant, there is, in the first place, no contradiction, but a deep underlying harmony. Against the charge that, while the doctrine of knowledge holds things-in-themselves to be forever absolutely hidden, the doctrine of development regards them as increasingly intelligible and knowable, Kant is shielded from the outset by his distinction of the sorts of knowledge. To such a stricture he would reply : Things-in-themselves are only so far intelligible as they are practically knowable ; theoretically knowable they never are. Every phenomenon is, as object of knowledge, a link in the nexus of things ; each has in our idea

of the world its fixed time and place; none is thinkable without the thing-in-itself which underlies them all; in none is this thing-in-itself knowable, it nowhere appears, *i.e.*, it never so appears that we could come across it in our knowledge and say, "There it is!" In order to know a phenomenon we must analyze and dissect it, resolve it into its knowable factors, and then from these construct our knowledge of it. Among such factors the thing-in-itself, the creative or originative ground of being of all phenomena, is not to be found. This does not appear, because it is the cause of appearance. No more does it show itself, either, in the evolution of things, since it does not exhaust itself in any one form or stage of development, nor consist in any transition. It can reveal itself, but not appear. It becomes manifest, yet ever remains hidden, like character in conduct, the genius of the artist in his work, the will to live or the inherent end of life in the organism, force in its exertion, God in the world. For something to appear means, in the exact sense of the word, that it is contained in an object in such a way that in the analysis of the object it will be hit upon and found. Now, even the most searching analysis of any phenomenon is not able to discover the ground *why* and *to what end* it is, *i.e.*, to discover its innermost being. To be sure, one need not necessarily trouble himself with this question, and, indeed,

in experimental knowledge and the so-called exact sciences, he is authorized to pay no heed to it whatever. One may also, if he choose, banish it completely from thought, as an idle question. But this the profound thinkers among philosophers, those upon whom the mystery of the world rests as a burden, can never do. Thus the Kantian distinction of things-in-themselves from phenomena, as well as its doctrine of the unknowableness of the former in the way of the scientific analysis of the latter, retains its deep and abiding meaning.

The question concerning the thing-in-itself as the ground of being of all phenomena carries us back to the *original ground* of things. This, according to Kant, becomes intelligible to us from no phenomenon, of whatever sort it may be, but solely from the final end of the world, *i.e.*, from the end which our reason, by means of its freedom from the world we conceive (sense-world), posits for itself, and realizes through the purification of the will. In this sense man may be recognized as the final end of the world. "Hence it is only the faculty of desire; but not that which makes man dependent (through sensuous impulses) upon nature, not that in respect to which the worth of his existence depends upon what he receives and enjoys. It is rather that worth which he alone can give to himself, and which consists in what he does, how and according to what

principles he acts, and not as a part of nature, but in the *freedom* of his appetitive faculties. That is, a *good will* is that whereby alone his existence can have an absolute worth, and in relation to which the existence of the world can have a final end."¹ Our philosopher judges like our poet: "Enjoyment debases;" "The deed is everything, nothing the fame." With this confession Goethe's *Faust* rises to the point of its highest morality.

If the end of our existence were mere happiness, or that enjoyment of the world which consists in continual amusement, if we came into the world only in order, like the man in the farce, to make a "joke" of ourselves, and to seek unmixed pleasure, it would seem that modern Pessimism, inspired as it is by the pleasure-seeking of our day, is right in declaring that *this* object of life has proved a failure, and that it is the opposite goal that has been reached, inasmuch as the sum of pleasure is in reality far less than the sum of pain, and *ennui* far more prevalent than amusement. Then the result of life, as that of the buffoonery, would be truly a most sad "joke." Nothing is more foolish and wanting in all genuine knowledge of man than this sort of a debit-and-credit account of pleasure and pain, of joy

¹ Kant: *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, § 86. (*Werke*, vol. vii., p. 326.) Cf. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.* vol. iv., pp. 505—17.

and sorrow, as if they could be added and subtracted like money, and the sum of life figured out by such a childish example. The pessimism and optimism of the ordinary sort stand upon precisely the same plane; both are *eudæmonistic*, and hold happiness to be the only desirable good. The pessimists, on the one hand, find the world so ill-conditioned that we can never attain and enjoy this good, but only and ever chase after it with unsatisfied craving, so that we are thus condemned to a continual Tantalus-torment, to the most intense misery conceivable. The optimists, on the other hand, find the world and the human mind so beneficently planned that, with the right knowledge and a corresponding regulation of conduct, we are able to attain a perfectly happy life.

As people are busying themselves a good deal nowadays with Kant, there is naturally considerable dispute, this way and that, as to whether his teachings are to be taken in the sense of a pessimistic or an optimistic view of life. But the simple fact that such a question is debated, as answerable by yes or no, shows sufficiently well how little Kant is understood. His doctrine is neither the one nor the other, since it does not judge of the object of life *eudæmonistically* at all. Were this object the happiness which we necessarily craved, according to the sensuous impulses of our nature, such a state of well-being, even

if it could be fully attained, would leave our moral nature empty and unsatisfied, since we should thereby utterly fail of the *truly human* or *personal* end of life, which cannot be given to us, but only posited, *i.e.*, *willed*, by ourselves.¹ The end of human existence in the world consists in man's *moral self-development*, which comprehends culture as well as all its wide interests, and which in its very nature is an unceasing and endless progress. Every solved problem presents new problems for solution. Here there is no idle bliss, which we are to enjoy with folded hands, no moment of complete contentment; yet all contentment worthy of man is only to be found in the way of this free self-development. Indeed, it is not to be *found*, but *won*: "Only he earns freedom as well as life who daily has to win it!" Contentment lies in no one moment, but in the entire fulness of life, in both the joys and sorrows of creating. He who traverses this path is free from the attacks of the monster *Care*, who robs man of life's every gratifying enjoyment; moral energy alone she cannot stay: that she merely intensifies. Of the end and worth of human life Kant judged at the close of his teleological view of the world, as Goethe at the end of *Faust*. It needed no magic to free man from care and the world's spirits of torment:

¹ Kant: *Kr. d. Urtheilskraft*, § 83. (*Werke*, vol. vii, p. 311 *et seq.*)

"Im *Weiterschreiten* find' er *Qual* and *Glück*,
Er, unbefriedigt jeden Augenblick!"¹

The goal of our moral self-development is freedom *from* the world. If "man under moral laws" is recognised as the final end of the world, then these laws must be recognised as world-laws, and the moral order of the world as the order of all things; then there must be also a moral author of the world, or an *original ground* of all things, which can be nothing other than the world-creating will or God. Thus Kant's teleological view of the world culminates in the moral theology which furnishes the basis for the only valid demonstration of the existence of God, whose reality Kant never doubted, whose theoretical demonstrability he denied and disproved in his doctrine of knowledge, whose existence he affirmed with complete certitude in his doctrine of freedom and faith. Without will as the original ground of the world, there is in the latter neither freedom, nor final end, nor development.

¹ "In marching onward, bliss and torment find,
Though, every moment, with unsated mind!"

—Taylor's Translation.

Faust, Part II., Act V., Scene 5.

CHAPTER IV.

EXAMINATION OF KANT'S FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES.

BY fixing and uniting Kant's fundamental doctrines, we have won the right conception of the system, as it was present to the mind of its author. It contains themes enough, which Kant has only sketched in outline, or not developed at all; problems enough, which he partly left unsolved, partly declared incapable of solution. To discover and supply the deficiencies is the task of scholars who wish to fill out and complete the work of the master without touching upon its principles. On the other hand, the attempt to extend the system beyond its original limits, and to advance where Kant remained stationary and commanded philosophy to halt, is a problem which leads for its solution to a transformation and development of the Kantian doctrines. But, in order to determine such a problem, we must ascertain whether the principles of Kant's teaching, in their authentic form, are permanent principles, and whether they are

fundamentally consistent in themselves and harmonious with one another.

I. EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE.

1. *The Contradiction in the Critique of Pure Reason.*

We fix our eyes, first of all, upon the doctrine of knowledge, which constitutes the real theme of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. And our first question is: Does Transcendental or Critical Idealism, the founding of which won for Kant the fame of being the Copernicus of philosophy, stand uncontradicted in the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself? The fundamental recognition of this doctrine of Idealism is unquestionably not the same thing as a logically consistent adherence to it. Here, as the special student will at once notice, we touch upon the point which involves the much-controverted difference between the first and second editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a point which we have already made the subject of a very careful and exhaustive discussion, to which we here take occasion to refer.¹ The present problem, which is concerned with the criticism of the Kantian doctrine, obliges us to return to this very important point.

¹ *Fischer: Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii., pp. 558-576.

It will be well to put the question itself as briefly and precisely as possible. Transcendental idealism teaches: all our phenomena or objects of experience are *mere ideas*, and nothing independent of the latter. That subjective phenomena are such, is beyond question. We are concerned, therefore, only with the objective phenomena; these are the things external to us, the phenomena in space, hence bodies or matter. Kant must necessarily have taught, and has taught in the most unambiguous manner in the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason," as it appears in the first edition of the *Critique*, that matter is a mere idea. In the second edition, he added a "Refutation of Idealism," in which he declares that matter is not a mere idea. This is the point with which we are here concerned. We have before us a contradiction, which no ingenious interpretation can explain away from either the spirit or letter of the original passages.

In the first edition of the *Critique*—to cite these passages—in the sections entitled "Paralogisms of Pure Reason" and "Observations on the Result of the Pure Doctrine of the Soul," we read the following: "We have undeniably shown in the *Transcendental Æsthetic* that bodies are mere phenomena of our external sense, and not things-in-themselves." "I understand, under the *Transcendental idealism* of all phenomena, that principle according to which we regard phenomena as a whole as mere

ideas, and not as things-in-themselves." "Since he (the Transcendental idealist) recognizes matter, and indeed its inner possibility, merely as phenomenon, which is nothing apart from our sensibility, matter is with him only a sort of ideas (perception) which are objective, not as if they were related to objects *in themselves external*, but because they refer perceptions to space, in which everything external is, while space itself is in us. To this Transcendental idealism we have already given our adherence at the beginning." "Now, external objects (bodies) are merely phenomena, hence nothing other than a sort of my ideas, the objects of which only have existence in virtue of these ideas; apart from them, however, they are nothing." "It is clearly shown that if I should take away the thinking subject, the entire material world would disappear, since it is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of the subject, and a sort of its ideas." ¹

According to Kant's doctrine, substance is only knowable through its persistence, and persistence only knowable in the phenomenon which at all times fills space. Hence *matter* is the only knowable substance, since it alone among objects persists. Now, the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* declares,

¹ Kant : *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. (*Werke*, vol. ii., pp. 667, 675, 676, 684.)

in its disproof of idealism: "Thus the perception of this persistence is only possible through a *thing* external to me, and not through the mere *idea* of such a thing."¹

Accordingly, as to what concerns things external to us, *i.e.*, bodies or matter, Kant teaches in the first edition of the *Critique*, that external objects (bodies) only have existence in virtue of our ideas, but apart from them they are nothing; in the second edition, on the other hand, that the perception of matter is only possible through a thing external to me, and not through the mere idea of such a thing. There he teaches that things external to us are mere ideas; here, on the other hand, that they are *not* mere ideas. There he teaches that things external to us have existence merely in virtue of our ideas, but that they are nothing independent of the latter; here, that they have existence, by no means in virtue of our ideas, but independently of them. Hence our ideas of things external to us, and these things themselves are different from one another, and external things must, consequently, be objects independent of our ideas, *i.e.*, things-in-themselves. Since, now, things external to us are in space, space also must be something independent of our thought. But this means utterly to abandon Transcendental idealism and to return under full sail to the old

¹ Kant: *Kr. d. r. Vernunft*. (*Werke*, vol. ii., p. 224.)

dogmatism. In his establishment of Transcendental idealism, Kant appears as the Copernicus of philosophy; in his refutation of "psychological idealism," on the contrary, as Ptolemy, or rather as Tycho Brahe, who confounded both systems.

The inconsistency of the two editions is perfectly obvious. The second, in which the text of the *Critique* should presumably have received its definitive form, contains the establishment of Transcendental idealism and at the same time a disproof of idealism, which directly contradicts the original doctrine. Accordingly, the Kantian *Critique of Pure Reason* or doctrine of knowledge, is here at variance with itself, and indeed in *literal* statement.

2. The Origin of the Contradiction.

The new refutation of idealism in the second edition of the *Critique*, as well as the notes and appendix to the *Prolegomena*, was called forth by the misconceptions which arose with the very first review of the Kantian masterpiece, the Transcendental idealism of the new doctrine being confounded with the old dogmatic idealism, and especially that of Berkeley.

Kant wished to shield his work from such misapprehensions, and therefore undertook radically to distinguish the new idealism from the old by a logical and convincing proof. The former establishes phenomena and experience; the latter, on the

contrary, bases itself upon the facts of inner experience. Hence Kant designates this dogmatic idealism as the “*empirical*” or “*psychological*.” He found this developed in two principal forms. Upon the ground of our inner experience, which furnishes nothing but ideas in us, empirical idealism had declared the existence of things external to us to be either doubtful or impossible. The former position was taken by Descartes, the latter by Berkeley. Hence Kant called the doctrine of the one the “*problematic*,” that of the other the “*dogmatic idealism*.”

Berkeley had a radically false idea of space, which, like colour, taste, etc., he ascribed to our sensations, and, consequently, regarded an idea of space independent of impressions as something impossible and wholly imaginary. He took as the matter of thought that which is the form of thought. Hence he denied the existence of external things. Kant rightly said: “The ground for this idealism has already been destroyed in our *Transcendental Æsthetic*.”¹

Thus it only remained to disprove Descartes. To do this, it was necessary to show that our inner experience was only possible under the presupposition of outer experience, which consists in the idea of external things. But since all ideas are in us, even

¹ Kant: *Kr. d. r. Vernunft*, “Refutation of Idealism.” (*Werke*, vol. ii., p. 223. Cf. 1st ed., pp. 67, 68. Note.)

those of things external to us, it had to be shown that these ideas were only possible under the presupposition of the *existence* of things external to us, or that "the idea of matter is only possible through a *thing* external to me, and not through the mere *idea* of such a thing." Precisely this course was taken, and for this reason, by the "Refutation of Idealism" in the second edition of the *Critique*. In order to prove the existence of things external to us, Kant made inner experience dependent upon outer, and outer experience dependent upon the existence of external things; that is, he made the existence of external things independent of our thought, and the latter dependent upon the former: he thus made things external to us, *i.e.*, bodies and matter, *things-in-themselves*. And so Kant subverted, in this particular, his own doctrine of Transcendental idealism, while seeking to vindicate it, and to secure it against confusion with empirical idealism. In order fundamentally to differentiate the one from the other, he tore them asunder in the very point in which they agree; for they agree in holding all our objects of knowledge to be phenomena or ideas, and as such in us. In order, now, to show that he could demonstrate what Descartes had been unable to prove, he brought forward a proof which Descartes had already made use of, and, indeed, in the same way,—that, namely, that our idea of bodies is only possible under the condition of the

existence of bodies independent of our ideas. In like manner Descartes had shown that matter or extended substance was a thing-in-itself, entirely independent of thought, and that space was the attribute of this thing, and likewise independent of thought.¹

Certainly this refutation of idealism is a very noteworthy example of how easily, in the *vindication* of his cause, even so powerful a thinker as Kant could surrender his own position, in order to avoid the mere appearance of agreement with certain related standpoints which he opposed. Kant and Berkeley both teach that space is in us, and that things external to us ~~are our~~ phenomena or ideas, and nothing independent of the latter. In spite of this agreement, however, their doctrines are fundamentally different. According to Berkeley, space is a sensation, like colour and taste; according to Kant, it is a perception which is independent of all sensation. According to Berkeley, space is a given material of thought, like all our impressions; according to Kant, it is a necessary form or fundamental law of thought. Thus Berkeley's idealism was overthrown by Kant's *Transcendental Æsthetic*, and consequently the confusion of the two points of view was utterly unjustifiable and false. Kant rightly appealed

¹ Cf. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. i. (3rd ed.), pp. 324-26.

to this refutation, and ought to have let the matter rest there. But he would have nothing in common with the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, and so now he demonstrates that external things are by no means mere ideas, and that matter is something independent of our thought. Berkeley had declared matter to be a nonentity, so Kant now demonstrates its reality, as if it were a thing-in-itself. Berkeley had said, Space is in us; so Kant now proves that it is external to us.

3. *The Second Refutation of Idealism. Kant versus Jacobi.*

But Kant had not satisfied himself with having disproved idealism in the *text* of the second edition of the *Critique*; he felt also called upon to furnish the *preface* to this edition with a long note, which should renew and confirm most emphatically the former refutation, and drive from the field an opponent who had but just appeared. This opponent was Jacobi, in his *Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza*, and his *Talks on David Hume*. The former appeared two years after the *Prolegomena* (1785), the latter in the same year as the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787), but some months earlier. Now Jacobi had maintained that we can never demonstrate the existence of external things, but only be certain of it through *faith*, since such existence becomes apparent to us purely through immediate

revelation. He opposed this position not only to all dogmatism, but also to all philosophical idealism, since the latter is obliged to hold external things to be mere ideas in us. This criticism also affects Transcendental idealism.

Of course, Jacobi understands, under external things, things independent of all our ideas, *i.e.*, things-in-themselves. Now Kant wants to prove the contrary; he wants to demonstrate the existence of external things in the same sense in which Jacobi maintains its indemonstrability. Thus originates the *Note* which he has inserted in his preface.¹ One sees in advance that he will abandon his standpoint a second time; he will show that external things are things-in-themselves. Really, the attack of Jacobi put Kant so beside himself, that he let idealism fall with a word. He says: "However innocent Idealism may be held to be (as in fact it is not) in respect to the essential aim of metaphysics, yet it is none the less an abuse of philosophy and of common human reason to be obliged to take the existence of external things (from which we nevertheless receive the entire material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) merely on *faith*, and not to be able, if any one is inclined to doubt it, to confront him with satisfactory proof." He had, to be sure, already

¹ Kant: *Kritik d. r. Vernunft*. Preface to 2nd ed. (*Werke*, vol. ii., pp. 31, 32)

disproved idealism and cleared himself of the charge of it, but "certain obscurities" were found in the expressions of the proof which should now completely disappear. And this time the refutation of idealism takes such a form that we can no longer doubt that external things figure as things-in-themselves; else also his disproof of Jacobi's philosophy of faith would be completely ineffectual.

We know that, according to the doctrine of Kant, all the material of our cognitions consists in our impressions or sensations, which we do not make, but receive, which are given to us, and, indeed, through things-in-themselves.¹ The new "note" now instructs us that it is external things "from which we receive the entire material of knowledge, even for our inner sense." Accordingly, external things figure as things-in-themselves.

According to the doctrine of Kant, *matter*, among all our objects of knowledge, is the only substance, since it is the only thing that persists; and as that which fills space, it is nothing other than external appearance or idea.² We are now told in the "note" most expressly, and in italics, the diametrical

¹ *Vide supra*, Chap. I., Part III., Sec. 2, on "The Thing-in-Itself."

² *Cf. supra*, Chap. IV., I. 1. : "The Contradiction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*."

opposite: "This persisting object, however, cannot be a perception in me, for all determining grounds of my being, which can be found in me, are ideas, and demand as such a persisting object distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and hence my existence in time, in which they change, can be determined." There is, accordingly, no doubt that in this passage, in order that all idealism may be disproved, and the existence of external things demonstrated, matter must be taken as something independent of our ideas, *i.e.*, as a thing-in-itself.

It is likewise pointed out to us anew, that inner experience is dependent upon outer, and that the latter is dependent upon the existence of external things. For, the "note" continues, "To this the remark may still be added, that the idea of something *persistent* in existence is not tantamount to a *persisting idea*, since this may be very variable and inconstant, as all our ideas are, even those of matter, and yet it is related to something persistent, which must consequently be an external thing distinct from all our ideas," etc. The Kantian doctrine holds matter to be (1) the sole persisting object; and (2) a mere appearance or *idea*; it is accordingly the only *persisting idea*, and, as such, completely identical with the idea of something persistent in existence. If, now, this persisting something must be, as the "note" declares, "an external thing, distinct from all our

ideas," then matter is a thing-in-itself. And if consistent, we shall now be obliged, in harmony with the "note," to distinguish also space and the idea of space, and to pronounce space an object wholly independent of and distinct from our idea of space, *i.e.*, a thing-in-itself, or the attribute of a thing-in-itself. And thus space becomes, once more, with Kant what it was with Descartes.

When thought is distinguished from the object of thought, as was done by Kant in his disproof of idealism and in the "note," Transcendental idealism is surrendered, and, at the same time, the possibility of explaining the correspondence between idea and object, *i.e.*, of explaining knowledge, and, as well, the possibility of understanding the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It was with this insight that Sigismund Beck declared such a distinction between thought and its object to imply a standpoint from which it was impossible to understand or rightly estimate the *Critique*. For thought can only correspond with its object, when its object is thought. This point of view, which regards the object of thought, not as a thing independent of thought, but as its necessary product, Beck called "the only possible" one for comprehending and rightly appreciating the *Critique of Pure Reason*. From this point of view he wrote a Commentary on Kant's Works, and, indeed, as he expressly says on the title-page

of his book, "*With Kant's Approval*" This is a very noteworthy fact, and one which must not be overlooked, when the question of the real teaching of Kant, and of passages that contradict it, is to be investigated and decided upon. Beck very well knew of the contradictions, but sought too lightly to explain them away, in permitting the philosopher to assume at times the language of dogmatism and the common consciousness for the sake of a pleasing intelligibility He thinks that when Kant talks about the object of thought as a thing independent of thought, he speaks, *e.g.*, as Copernicus might of the rising and setting of the sun, he simply speaks according to the common usage, without at all changing his standpoint } We find, however, that, in the passages we have examined, Kant exchanges his standpoint for that of the common consciousness, since he *teaches* that the existence of external things can be *demonstrated* in the sense in which such existence is denied by dogmatic idealism and presupposed by the common understanding

Kant had proved the existence of external things in a manner perfectly consistent with Transcendental idealism, and, indeed, in such a way that the fact of the external world, as it appears to the common consciousness, was completely explained He had pointed out, that is, that the existence of things external to us is *immediately* apparent to every human consciousness—a fact

which would be impossible if external things were anything other than phenomena or ideas. He says, "Now all external objects (bodies) are merely phenomena, hence nothing other than a sort of my ideas, the objects of which only have existence through these ideas, while apart from them they are nothing. *External things exist, therefore, just as really as I myself exist*, and both, in truth, on the *immediate* evidence of my self-consciousness, only with the difference that the idea of myself as the thinking subject is referred merely to the inner sense, while the ideas which designate extended beings are also referred to the outer sense. I am *just as little obliged to deduce* the actuality of external objects as the actuality of the objects of my inner sense (my thought); for they are on both sides nothing but ideas, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is a sufficient proof of their actuality."¹ This lucid and highly significant declaration stands in the *first* edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; in the second edition it is left out, and in the observations that take its place it is by no means compensated for by any equivalent statement, although, here also, at the close of the criticism of rational psychology, it is noted that outer and inner objects "are distinguished from one another

¹ Kant: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1st ed.). "Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology." (*Werke*, vol. ii., p. 676.)

only so far as the one *appears* external to the other, and that which underlies the phenomenon of matter, as thing-in-itself, may perhaps not be so unlike in kind.”¹ As if totally unconscious that he had already explained from the Critical point of view the existence of the external world, and shown with transparent clearness that, and why, we are not obliged logically to *deduce* the actuality of external objects, Kant now gives in the second edition of the *Critique* a refutation of idealism in which the existence of external things is *sylogistically* proved. The syllogism runs, in brief, as follows: Our inner experience is dependent upon the outer; outer experience is dependent upon the existence of external things: therefore external things are independent of our inner experience, and are not mere ideas.

4. *Review of Objections.*

Emil Arnoldt has shown himself, by a series of instructive inquiries, such a thorough and scholarly critic of both the life²

¹ Kant *Kr. d. r. Vernunft* (2nd ed.). “Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.” (*Werke*, vol. ii., pp. 326, 327.)

² By his recent biographical studies he has, among other things, shown, *for the first time* beyond doubt, that Kant was *never* enrolled in the theological faculty, and that his pedagogical and social relations to the Count Kayserling’s House in Rautenburg and Königsberg are to be determined according to family connections hitherto unknown. *Vide* E. Arnoldt: *Kants Jugend und die fünf ersten Jahre seiner Privatdocentur* (Königsberg, 1882), pp. 26, and 54-57.

and doctrines of Kant, that his investigations are deserving of the most careful attention. In his commendatory review of my work, he has also brought forward the points in which he does not share my views. The most important among them concerns the contradiction stated to exist in the Kantian doctrine of knowledge. Respecting the character and fundamental import of Transcendental idealism we are agreed. Arnoldi, too, is "not disposed to explain away the philosophical difference between the two editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*." He grants that the second edition might give rise to a false conception of the Kantian doctrine, and indeed, as a matter of fact, has done so; and that the first edition, owing to the energetic and unambiguous manner in which it teaches the ideality of the material world, is to be preferred to the second. On the other hand, he contends that the difference between the two editions does not affect the *fundamental principles* of Kant's doctrine of knowledge, and that, in particular, the "Refutation of Idealism," which Kant developed in the second edition, is not inconsistent with Transcendental idealism. The rather, Kant here sought to show, as a refutation of Descartes only, that our inner ex-

I mention this incidentally, in order to correct my own exposition in reference to Kant's theological studies. *Vide* Fischer: *Gesch d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii., p. 51. Cf. Pref., p. viii.

perience is dependent upon and mediated by the outer; he had succeeded in proving it, and this constituted the special service rendered by his new "Refutation of Idealism."¹ I must oppose Arnoldt's pointed arguments for the following reasons: (1) Transcendental idealism teaches the full and direct immediacy of inner and outer experience. This doctrine is contradicted when outer experience is regarded as the means and condition of the inner. Outer experience cannot be such a condition, since it is itself also inner experience; it is a part or special and necessary sphere of inner experience. (2) To show that our inner experience is dependent upon and mediated by the outer was not the *end* of Kant's new "Refutation of Idealism," but merely a stadium of the argument. The real end was to show the dependence of outer experience upon the *existence of external things*, that is, to show that *external things are independent of our thought*. Then things external to us figure as things-in-themselves; then phenomena are confounded with things-in-themselves; then Transcendental idealism and Kant's whole doctrine of knowledge are completely contradicted. This is the point in question. I maintain, therefore, that the Transcendental idealism expounded in both editions of the *Critique*, compared

¹ E. Arnoldt: *Kant nach Kuno Fischers neuer Darstellung* (Königsberg, 1882), pp. 31-42.

with the new "Refutation of Idealism," and the Note to the preface of the second edition, is related to these latter positions, as A to non-A. Consequently, in order to disprove this, it must be shown that Kant has not denied throughout the first edition of the *Critique* that external things (bodies) are independent of our ideas, and that he has by no means affirmed and sought to demonstrate the same in the passages cited.

Arnoldt denies that there is a contradiction in the two editions, and seeks to graduate their difference. "The first shows with greater explicitness that bodies, but with less explicitness that souls, are phenomena; it approximates spiritualism. The second shows with greater explicitness that souls, but with less that bodies, are phenomena; it vindicates, as opposed to spiritualism, which it sets aside, the relative justification of materialism, which it likewise rejects." If one only knew in each case the degree of "the greater" and "the less explicitness"! For Kant declared with *all* explicitness, in the first edition of the *Critique*, that bodies were mere phenomena, and denied with all explicitness, in both editions, that souls were phenomena or knowable objects at all.¹

In an excellent paper, evincing exact technical knowledge and

¹ *Id.*: p. 32.

a penetrating judgment, written upon my history of philosophy, and especially my work on Kant, Johann Witte has also touched upon the critical question with which we are at present occupied. He is of my opinion, that the "altered exposition of the second edition is *not* to be regarded as a change for the better," but denies that it contradicts the fundamental doctrine of the first edition, and would limit the difference of the two to the fact that "the second weakens the idealistic character of the first by *indistinctness*." I must object to this expression as too indefinite, and to Witte's further explanation as incorrect. What Kant seeks in the passages cited to show, as appears both from the passages and the context, is not, as Witte supposes, that *external things are independent of subjective or individual thought*, but of thought as such. Of that, the Note appended to the preface of the second edition—which Kant intended to confirm the "Refutation of Idealism" to be found in the text—does not leave the least doubt. Nor, indeed, does the "Refutation" itself, according to which "the perception of this persistence is only possible through a *thing* external to me, and not through the mere *idea* of such a thing." Now, Witte interprets "the perception of this persistence" as that "of my existence in time." This interpretation seems to me impossible, for two reasons: because (1) "my existence in time" is not persistent,

and because, (2) according to Kant's express teaching, no existence, among all *knowable* objects, persists, except *matter*. If Kant, as Witte holds, always understands by "thing" an "object thought," or the idea of a thing, then he in reality says in the above passage: "The perception of this persistence is only possible through a thing (*i.e.*, through the idea of a thing) external to me, and not through mere idea of a thing external to me." It is evident that no sort of skilful exegesis can explain away the contradiction which I have pointed out and traced to its origin. And I ought certainly to be protected from the supposition, which surely would not be entertained by so acute and expert a critic as Witte, that any prepossession for the doctrine of another philosopher, as Hegel, has exerted the least influence upon my estimate of Kant.¹

It is always a thankworthy and profitable experience to receive the criticisms of thorough scholars, in order to be able either to correct one's own views, or, as I may have succeeded in doing in the present important question, to confirm them. But it is most disagreeable to be obliged to repel opponents who know nothing whatever of the matter in question, or of the method in which it,

¹ Joh. Witte: *Kuno Fischers Behandlung der Geschichte der Philosophie und sein Verhältniss zur Kantphilologie*. *Allpr. Monatsschr.*, vol. xx., pp. 129-151, esp. pp. 145-148.

is treated, yet who, with ignorant and over-confident loquacity, take part in the discussion, and affect to write a polemical treatise, such as one of our weekly papers has granted an unknown author against me.¹

It will suffice to point out, by a striking illustration, what ignorance of the Critical philosophy, and what complete incapacity for a comprehension of it, our anonymous critic exhibits with his empty bombastic phrases. Every one versed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* knows that Kant regarded the standpoints of transcendental idealism and empirical realism on the one hand, and those of transcendental realism and empirical idealism on the other, as necessarily belonging together; and that he united the first two in his doctrine, and claims to have disproved the other two, which belong to dogmatism. Transcendental idealism teaches the origin of our common phenomenal world; empirical realism teaches that there are, accordingly, no other objects of knowledge but phenomena, or sensible things. Therefore the two standpoints necessarily go together, and their names merely denote different sides of the same way of thinking. It is precisely the same with the other two. Transcendental realism teaches that things external to us are in-

¹ *Die Grenzboten*, No 40 (1882): *Kant und Kuno Fischer*, pp. 10-17.

dependent of our thought, or are things-in-themselves ; empirical idealism teaches that precisely on that account we do not conceive external things immediately, but only mediately, *i.e.*, by logical inference, and that therefore we can be less certain of their existence than of our own thought ; or, what is the same thing, that the existence of our thinking being (soul) is alone certain, while the existence of external things is uncertain or doubtful. In other words, whoever is a transcendental realist must also be an empirical idealist. These two standpoints are not at variance with one another, but identical, and their names simply denote different sides of the same method of thought. If it is as the transcendental realist maintains respecting the existence of external things, then it must be as the empirical idealist teaches regarding our idea of things, and the certainty of their existence. The two points of view need no reconciliation, since they do not conflict with one another, but are complementary sides of the same thing, and together constitute the character of that dogmatic rationalism which was founded by Descartes, and overthrown by the Critical investigations of Kant.¹ The matter stands thus. And now the *Grenzboten* lets its philosopher announce the following nonsense, with that

Fischer : *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii. (3rd ed.), pp. 450-456.

ridiculous emphasis which delights empty heads: "Kant exerted his *whole prodigious* power to *reconcile* the *contradiction* between empirical idealism and transcendental realism,"¹ etc. So Kant (1) reconciled two standpoints which, according to his view, are completely *harmonious*, he (2) reconciled two points of view, both of which he *proved to be untenable*; and, in order to solve a contradiction which, according to his doctrine, is none, nor ever was one, he (3) "*exerted his prodigious power*," and, moreover, the "*whole*" of it! It is impossible to utter more nonsense in fewer words.

I come back to the result of my examination of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, and must regard it as sustained. According to Kant's doctrine, things-in-themselves are to be distinguished from phenomena, hence also from things external to us, with the utmost precision, and every confusion of the two is to be most carefully guarded against. Notwithstanding, in the text and in the preface of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant has refuted idealism in such a way that, things external to us are recognised as independent of our thought, hence as things-in-themselves, and consequently the latter are confounded with phenomena. It corresponds com-

¹ "*Die Grenzboten*," No. 40 (1882), p. 16.

pletely to the Kantian doctrine, both in its spirit and letter, to ascribe reality and causality to things-in-themselves. Yet it just as much contradicts this doctrine to attribute to them theoretical knowableness (*empirical* reality) and *external* causality. They are the causes of our sensible impressions, or of the empirical material of our knowledge, but they are not external causes, since these are external things or phenomena, which originate from sensations—hence cannot create the latter. It is, accordingly, a radically false and inverted conception of the Kantian doctrine to regard it as holding things-in-themselves to be the *external* causes of our affections of sense. Such a conception is absolutely impossible with Transcendental idealism, but with the later “Refutation of Idealism” it is not impossible—indeed, it is so far possible, that it soon became the customary one with Kantians of the ordinary sort. It is this view which Fichte, in his opposition to the Kantians, and later Schopenhauer, in his *Critique of the Kantian Philosophy*, could not strongly enough condemn as anti-Kantian and contradictory. Fichte said: “So long as Kant did not expressly declare, that *sensations are to be explained in philosophy from an externally present, in itself transcendental object*, so long I shall not believe what these expounders tell us about Kant. But if he makes this declaration, I shall sooner hold the *Critique of Pure Reason* to be the product of

remarkable chance than that of a mind."¹ Yet it is just as false and inverted a view of the Kantian doctrine to hold that it denies all reality and causality whatever to things-in-themselves, since they cannot be the *external* causes of our sensations, and that it recognises them as nothing further than mere inoperative notions. I have already shown in detail, both from the spirit and letter of the Kantian system, that our philosopher taught, and must have taught, the reality and causality of things-in-themselves, only this reality is not the empirical, and this causality not the sensible and external, but the supersensible and intelligible—namely, the causality of *will*. Is will and freedom, then, according to Kant, somehow not thing-in-itself, and at the same time reality and activity? The thing-in-itself is, according to Kant's explicit teaching, the cause of our sensations. The thing-in-itself is, according to Kant's explicit teaching, will. How can will be the cause of our sensations, of our sensibility, and of the constitution of our reason in general? *How?* That is the question. Kant regarded an answer to it as for ever impossible. Schopenhauer saw in it the enigma of the world, which he sought to solve by his doctrine of the will. And to-day's history of organic development established by Darwin,

¹ J. G. Fichte : *Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre. Vide Werke*, vol. i., p. 486.

implies, as appears from the intelligent way in which it grasps the relation of function and organ, this factor which Schopenhauer called the *will to live*¹

If Kant had not maintained the *being* of things-in-themselves independent of all ideas and phenomena, a man like Herbart, that pronounced opponent of all idealism and monism, would never have called himself a "Kantian," and have been convinced that "Kant possessed the true notion of being" He who had demonstrated the impossibility of the ontological proof for the existence of God, as Kant had done in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was, in Herbart's view, "the man to overthrow the old metaphysics"²

II EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINES OF FREEDOM AND DEVELOPMENT

I Schopenhauer's Critique of the Kantian Philosophy

In his *Critique of the Kantian Philosophy* (which is based upon the second edition of the chief work), Schopenhauer has accounted the same the highest product which the history of philosophy has brought forth It is related to the old metaphysics

¹ Cf *supra*, Chap I, Part III, 2, and Chap III Part I

² Cf *infra*, Chap V Part II, 2

of the nature of things (God, the world, and the soul) as the true view of the world to the false, or as the new chemistry to alchemy And even the profound idealistic systems of old time, which, as the religion of India and the Platonic philosophy, had attained the insight that our sense-world is only conceived and phenomenal, are related to the Kantian doctrine as the incorrectly established truth to that which is correctly established, or as the heliocentric view of the world of a Pythagorean to that of Copernicus. At the same time the Kantian philosophy wants both completeness and consistency. Its two chief merits are accompanied by two chief errors. Its greatest merit consists in the "distinction of phenomenon from thing-in-itself," by which "the complete diversity of the Real and the Ideal," and the merely conceived or phenomenal (hence not real) being of our sense-world, become apparent. Its second merit consists in the "knowledge of the undeniably moral meaning of human conduct, as entirely different from and not dependent upon the laws of phenomena, nor even explicable in accordance with them, but as something that is immediately connected with the thing-in-itself."¹

The first of the two main errors of Kant, Schopenhauer finds

¹ Schopenhauer: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. i., Appendix (5th ed., 1879), pp. 494-500.

in the fact that he has not clearly distinguished between sensible and abstract or reflective knowledge. This has led to irremediable confusion, now by falsely confounding, now by falsely opposing the two sorts of knowledge. Thus Kant has denied sensible knowledge to the understanding, as if there could be a visible sense-world without understanding; and has treated reason, not as the faculty of abstract or reflective knowledge by means of judgments and conclusions, but as that of principles and moral conduct, while, in truth, it only determines the rules according to which prudent conduct is regulated. Moral or virtuous, and reasonable or prudent, are by no means synonymous terms. The Machiavelian policy is not virtuous, but it is, indeed, clever and reasonable, while self-sacrificing generosity is quite as virtuous as it is unwise. From the sensible knowledge of the understanding there arises the abstract, through the faculty of reflection or thought (reason). Hence sensible perceptions are related to notions, as sensible objects to thought-objects, or as "*phenomena*" to "*noumena*," but *not* as appearances to things-in-themselves; for abstract notions represent nothing but appearances. Kant's treatment of the difference between phenomena and noumena as equivalent to the difference between appearances and things-in-themselves, and his consequent designation of the latter as noumena, has proved a

~~mischievous and fatal error, growing out of that first fundamental~~
one.¹

The second main error, which seriously conflicts with the fundamentally idealistic view of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, consists in the false introduction of the thing-in-itself as the external cause of our sensations. It is not the recognition of a thing-in-itself as related to a given phenomenon that is erroneous, but this method of deducing it; and it is this which proved troublesome to the second edition of the *Critique* in its "Refutation of Idealism." "No one imagines that he knows the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and has a clear notion of Kant's doctrine, when he has read it only in the second or in one of the following editions; that is absolutely impossible, for he has read only a mutilated, corrupted, and in some measure spurious text."² It is equivalent to a contradiction of the fundamental idealism of the Kantian doctrine to regard the thing-it-itself, according to the law of causality, as the *external* cause of our sensations. And it is equivalent to an utter misconstruction and denial of the entire Kantian doctrine to reject the thing-in-itself altogether, or to deny it reality, *i.e.*, the character of original being,

¹ Schopenhauer: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. i., pp. 513 and 517, 563-566, 610-614.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 515-517.

as has recently been done in some of the latest periodicals. Schopenhauer unjustly attempted to ascribe this view of the Kantian system—which he was wont to call “nonsensical tittle-tattle”—to Fichte, who, on the contrary, had maintained, like Schopenhauer, that the logically consistent criticism of reason could never teach the *external* existence and causality of things-in themselves,¹ and had, like him, denied the unknowableness of the same, and held that the thing-in-itself is to be *immediately* known in our self-consciousness, that it is so known, and, indeed, as *will*.

We have here no interest in further pursuing Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, since that would necessarily lead to an examination of his own doctrine, which saw itself obliged, following its distinction between understanding and reason, between the sensible knowledge of the one and the abstract knowledge of the other, to reject entirely Kant's doctrine of the categories of the understanding and the postulates of reason. In the two chief points which constitute the character of Kant's system, viz., in the doctrines of the ideality of all phenomena (objects), and of the reality of the thing-in-itself, which is completely independent of and different

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 119, 120.

from phenomena, Schopenhauer is agreed with Kant, and has sought to develop his own system—*The World as Will and Idea*—in accordance with these principles. In his view respecting the groundwork of the Kantian philosophy we must concur; also in his view that the confusion of phenomena and things-in-themselves conflicts with this groundwork; also in his view that things-in-themselves are confounded with phenomena when they are recognized as things external to us, and as the external causes of our sensations; also in his view that in the “Refutation of Idealism,” as developed in the second edition of the *Critique*, things external to us do figure as something independent of all thought, and accordingly as things-in-themselves. When, however, Schopenhauer holds that not merely the *external* causality of things-in-themselves, but their causality in general, is irreconcilable with the Kantian doctrine (since, according to the latter, the notion of causality in general is inapplicable to things-in-themselves), we cannot agree with him, either that such a view contains the contradiction he claims, or that the first edition of the *Critique* is free from *this* contradiction, if it were one. That things-in-themselves are the supersensible substratum or hidden ground of the constitution of our reason, hence also that of our sensations and world of sense, Kant himself declared to be “the constant assertion of his criticism.” It never occurred to him

to apply temporal or sensible causality to things-in-themselves, their causality is the timeless or intelligible, just as their reality is not temporal, but timeless, reality¹ If Schopenhauer will recognise the validity of no other than time-causality, that is his affair, and the discussion of it belongs to the exposition and criticism of his system, with which we are not now concerned. He censures Kant for ascribing causality to things-in-themselves. Why does he commend his affirmation of their *reality*? It has been difficult enough for Schopenhauer himself, and a wholly futile attempt withal, to ascribe to the thing in-itself (will) original being, and at the same time to deny it causality. After I have shown in what points I agree with Schopenhauer concerning the difference between the two editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the contradiction in the Kantian doctrine of knowledge, I must express the wish that, respecting this very question, those points shall not be overlooked in which I differ from him.

2. *The Correspondence between the Doctrines of Knowledge and Freedom*

The Kantian doctrine of knowledge, subject to the contradiction pointed out, conflicts with the doctrine of freedom. Free from this contradiction, it establishes the possibility of freedom,

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chap. I, Part III, Sec. 2, and Chap. II, Part II, Sec. 1.

and, indeed, *it* alone among all systems. For there is no doubt that, according to this doctrine, the thing-in-itself, absolutely distinguished from all phenomena and absolutely independent of space and time, is, and can be, nothing other than freedom or *will*. We have already enlarged upon this point at such length that we here need only to refer to that earlier discussion.¹ The three *Critiques* may be taken as the authentic documents for the assertion: The *Critique of Pure Reason* in its doctrine of intelligible and empirical character, the *Critique of Practical Reason* in its doctrine of the reality of freedom and the primacy of will, and the *Critique of Judgment* in its doctrine of natural adaptation and immanent natural ends, as well as its doctrine of final moral ends and the original ground of the world. After Kant has shown with such fulness and clearness the connection of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom, or, what is the same thing, the identity between thing-in-itself and will, we cannot possibly think, with Schopenhauer, that the matter only hovered dimly before him, like a presentiment; and that he recognised the thing-in-itself as will, not with the conviction of a philosopher, but as "A good man, through obscurest aspiration, has still an instinct of the one true way."² "I therefore venture

¹ *Vide supra*, Chap. II., Part II.

² *Faust*.—Taylor's tr.

to assume," said Schopenhauer, "although it is not to be proved, that Kant, as often as he spoke of the thing-in-itself, always thought in the obscurest depths of his mind indistinctly of will."¹ But after Schopenhauer himself has recognised the "distinction of phenomenon from thing-in-itself," and the "knowledge of the undeniably moral meaning of human conduct, as something that is immediately connected with the thing-in-itself," as the two greatest services of our philosopher, and has extolled his doctrines of time and space, and of intelligible and empirical character, as "the two diamonds in the crown of Kantian fame," we are compelled to regard the sentence just cited, not only as an imperfect and less commendatory estimate of the services of Kant, but as an obvious contradiction of his own statement. Kant must have been conscious of what he taught, when he apprehended things-in-themselves as *Ideas*, these as *ends*, these as determinations of *will*, and the will itself as *freedom*, which, although revealed to us with immediate and absolute certainty only in our own moral being, is nevertheless necessarily identical with "that supersensible which we are obliged to posit as underlying nature as phenomenon," *i.e.*, it is necessarily identical with the thing-in-itself.²

¹ Schopenhauer : *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. i., p. 599.

² Cf. *supra*, Chap. III., Part III., Sec. 3.

3. *The Contradiction in the Doctrine of Freedom.*

Between the logically consistent Kantian doctrines of knowledge and freedom, there is no contradiction, but the deepest and most perfect harmony. To have discovered and expounded this harmony is Kant's immortal service.

The doctrine of freedom demands a system of morals absolutely free from hedonism, elevated entirely above every eudæmonistic view of life, and thus above all strife between optimism and pessimism. Kant himself, in separating virtue from happiness, developed such a system of ethics; but when in his doctrine of the *summum bonum* he united them, this high ethical ground was virtually abandoned. After all eudæmonistic aims in life had been utterly shut out in a system based upon freedom and the purity of will, they should not have been introduced by the doctrines of the *summum bonum* and of the immortality of the soul. We were obliged earlier in the discussion, in order to set forth clearly Kant's doctrine of immortality, and to distinguish the true conception of it from the false, to point out this contradiction in his doctrine of freedom, and may avoid all repetition by referring to those remarks.¹

¹ *Vide supra*, Chap. II., Part III., Sec. 2. Cf. Schopenhauer: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. 1., pp. 620-622.

4 *The Contradiction between the Doctrines of Knowledge and Development.*

That Kant had already furthered the evolutionist view of things before the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and had made it his working problem, that he had established this view by means of the *Critique*, and had developed its principles in his treatment of both nature and civilization, or the whole organic, social, and moral world—all this has been pointed out in a previous section¹ We have also shown that, according to his doctrine, the world-development is to be apprehended as *phenomenon*, and in fact, as *teleological phenomenon*, that in its unity as well as in its ultimate ground it is nothing other than the *progressive revelation of freedom*² We therefore regarded Kant's doctrine of development as a unification of his doctrines of knowledge and freedom, and the world development itself as a unification of phenomenon and thing-in-itself, and such a unification as neither confounds both nor negates itself by holding the unknowableness of the thing-in-itself, on the ground that, as the immanent end of a thing, it is not to be found in the phenomenon, as the object of our experience, by even the minutest analysis

Vide supra, Chap III, Parts I and II

² *Vide supra*, Chap III, Part III

There is, accordingly, a point of view from which the Kantian doctrine of development does *not*, in the first place, conflict with the doctrine of knowledge.

We must conceive the development of things as teleological, and as universal. We must extend its application to the entire universe, but its knowableness must be limited to the moral order of things, since all ends become known merely from the will, and the will only from one's own practical reason. Consequently, the development of things, like ends in general, remains theoretically unknowable. Since, now, all phenomena are objects of our experience or scientific (theoretical) knowledge, and development is a phenomenon, and yet held not to be an object of knowledge, we are here confronted with a contradiction between the Kantian doctrines of knowledge and development, which affects the truth of the latter. It consists in ascribing the character of phenomenon to development, and at the same time denying its scientific knowableness. The Kantian philosophy teaches the unknowableness of thing-in-itself and the knowableness of phenomenon: this, its foundation doctrine, is shattered as soon as it sees itself obliged to recognise either the knowableness of the former or the unknowableness of the latter. To such a recognition it is brought by its doctrine of development. Without the knowledge of the end, or of the thing-in-itself,

which underlies the development of things, this development is an incomprehensible, unknowable phenomenon, and therefore, in strictness, *no* phenomenon at all. If the immanent end of things is not apparent to us, then certainly there *appears* to us no development in the nature of things. Hence the Kantian doctrine of development finds itself in the following dilemma: either the intelligible, knowable, *i.e.*, *phenomenal*, character of development must be denied, or the knowableness of the thing-in-itself affirmed; and, indeed, not merely its practical and moral knowableness, but also its theoretical and scientific.

III. EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PHENOMENA AND THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES.

1. *The Knowableness of Human Reason.*

The scientific validity of the doctrine of development demands this affirmation. Hence the Kantian doctrine of knowledge does not admit of permanent acceptance in the form it received in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in accordance with which only sensuous phenomena are objects of knowledge, and all theoretical knowledge is confined to the realm of phenomena or objects of sense, while all practical knowledge remains restricted to the realm of freedom or of Ideas, and any further knowledge is held to be impossible. But the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself contradicts this

result, inasmuch as it is obliged to admit the existence of a sort of knowledge which is neither practical (moral), nor has sensible things or phenomena for its objects. This knowledge is the *criticism itself*, so far as in its investigation it discovers and establishes the conditions of experience. The *Critique* professes to have determined in its *Transcendental Æsthetic* and *Analytic* the constitution or organization of human reason. This knowledge is not a *practical* knowledge, for its subject is not freedom ; and its objects are not *phenomena*, since according to the *Critique* space and time are not phenomena, any more than productive imagination, pure understanding, or pure consciousness. This knowledge is not *experience*, for its objects are precisely those conditions which precede all experience and make it possible. All knowledge which aims in the first place only at insights, and not at conduct, must be termed *theoretical* and scientific. Such a knowledge is presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason* ; it is neither empirical nor practical, but theoretical, and such as lays claim to the character of science : it is the *Doctrine of Knowledge* ; and *that* it would not be, if its doctrine of knowledge were not itself knowledge. It establishes the knowledge of experience by showing how experience originates ; and it would fail of its end entirely if it itself were experience ; for that would be tantamount to establishing experience by experience, hence not establishing

it at all, but presupposing it, as the dogmatic philosophy had done. And it ought not to be objected here that Kant, therefore, has used the inductive method of experimental science, in establishing his doctrine of knowledge, so that the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself rests on experience. Let us not deceive ourselves by an ambiguous play with the word "experience." In strictness, our philosopher recognises only the knowledge of *phenomena*, while, on the contrary, the *Critique of Pure Reason* virtually leads to a sort of knowledge the objects of which are *not* phenomena, but the subjective conditions of phenomena. The fact of experience is one thing, its establishment another. Whatever is established by experience is *empirically* known, that, on the contrary, by which experience itself is established is, precisely on that account, no object of empirical, but only of *Transcendental* knowledge. These two sorts of knowledge Kant must have distinguished in the way that he did. Transcendental knowledge has the character of theoretical as opposed to practical, but not that of empirical, knowledge. We thus see how the *Critique of Pure Reason* transcends by its own insights the bounds which it had set as the insurmountable limits of all theoretical knowledge.

The insight into those subjective conditions from which phenomena (objects of experience) and the knowledge of phenomena

originate, constituted Transcendental Idealism ; and the insight thereby gained, that we can have no other objects of knowledge than sensuous phenomena, constituted Empirical Realism. We know the necessary connection that subsists between these two doctrines : they are related as premise and conclusion. Nothing is therefore more thoughtless in estimating the Critical philosophy, than to leave the character of Transcendental idealism, whether through ignorance or misconception, entirely out of sight, and then to declare the Kantian doctrine to be Empiricism.

The Critique of Pure Reason involves the problem of deducing from the nature of our reason—which is revealed to us only through the most penetrating self-knowledge—the conditions of experience ("faculties of knowledge," Kant termed them), and thus of developing the doctrine of knowledge into an actual *doctrine of the process of knowledge*. This problem remains unsolved in the Kantian philosophy itself ; but we have shown that the *Critique of Pure Reason* contains the data for such a solution, and that its investigations are ordered in such a way that it shows us in outline the course of development of human knowledge from perception to scientific thought, and to the systematization of the sciences.¹ Now, the doctrine of knowledge

¹ *Vide supra*, Chap. III., Part II, Sec. 2. Cf. Fischer : *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii. (3rd ed.), p. 519 *et seq.*

itself is scientific knowledge, and the doctrine of development founds itself upon the notion of *end*, without which no sort of development as such is intelligible. Hence this notion may not be regarded merely as a moral principle for the knowledge of the moral order of things, and a maxim of reflection for contemplating the organic world, it is a *principle of knowledge* which is valid for the entire knowable order of the world, the natural as well as the moral.

2 *The Knowableness of Natural Ends in Man and of Blind Intelligence*

Let us examine the reason why Kant limited the knowableness of ends to the moral, and excluded it from the natural world, —why he saw himself obliged to deny knowableness to the immanent natural end, which he had introduced into his *Critique of Pure Reason* as a necessary Idea in our contemplation of the organic world, and as the principle of teleological judgment. He held that ends are only so far knowable as they are consciously possessed and willed, that only will and intelligence can posit ends and act in accordance with them, that consequently nature or the material world has no ends (no knowable ones), and that therefore also the ends, without which we are unable to comprehend the organization and constitution of *living* bodies, are

not forces operative in nature, not knowable objects, but mere *Ideas*. They are, however, necessary Ideas; for, although in organized bodies the parts should be understood in the light of the whole, we, with our discursive understanding, can only put together and comprehend the whole from the parts, and as we are consequently incapable of perceiving and knowing such a whole as the creative *ground* of life, we must conceive it as its *end*. The whole, that is, which we are to conceive, but cannot perceive sensibly as object, we are obliged to think as *Idea*, and hence we are compelled to consider living bodies *teleologically*. Had we an intuitive understanding, we should not need a faculty of teleological judgment. In its weakness our reason takes refuge, as it were, in this faculty, developing it out of its own primitive powers, because it needs it to compensate, as well as may be, for its native incapacity. By the way in which Kant establishes the reflective judgment in general, and the teleological in particular, the latter presents itself as a necessary *form of development* of human reason, which seeks to solve a problem, to supply a needed knowledge, and, under the peculiar constitution of its intellectual faculties, can attain its object in no other way.¹

Ends in nature, therefore, according to the Kantian teaching,

¹ Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iv. (3rd ed.), pp. 492-498.

are unknowable and in effect impossible, since they require to be posited by will and intelligence; and such an unconscious intelligence, such an end-active yet blind force, contradicts the notion of matter. Thus hylozoism, which teaches that matter is living and enlivened by inherent causes, was regarded by Kant as the death of all Philosophy of Nature. Since, now, living organized matter exists, and we cannot conceive of it except as adapted to ends, Kant was obliged to deduce the end-active underlying force from the moral ground of things, *i.e.* from the *divine will*, and thus to give his teleological view of life and of the world a *theistic* basis. But the immanent natural ends, the Idea of which rules and guides our teleological judgment, are thereby transformed into divine purposes, and life itself, as well as all natural development, remains unexplained and inexplicable.

The unknowableness of natural ends is based by Kant upon the impossibility of an unconscious intelligence or of a blind will. But the reality of such a blind intelligence had already been shown by Leibnitz in his doctrine of the unconscious or imperceptible ideas (*perceptions petites*), a doctrine which he raised to fundamental importance in his theory of knowledge. And, in fact, Kant also was obliged to recognize the knowableness of natural ends and the unconscious activity of our intellec-

tual faculties. He recognized it in human nature, though he had denied it in the organic world. We further the moral ends of life by means of the "mechanism of instincts"—as Kant terms the impulses of our natural ends of life—without being conscious of them and willing them. Our natural interests create that struggle for existence, and that increasing complexity of industrial society, from which issue, unconsciously and without volition, the moral orders of life. Wherever Kant established the necessity of the latter, he laid the greatest stress upon the reality and activity of our purely natural, and, at the same time, intelligible ends of life.¹ That we conceive a common world of sense is a fact that our reflective consciousness finds at hand, but does not create, since it is, the rather, produced from the material of our impressions by the systematizing representative faculties of reason, and hence arises through the non-reflective and unconscious activity of intellect. Kant saw in the productive imagination this form-giving faculty, which acts unconsciously in accordance with the laws of pure consciousness, and constitutes the bond that unites sense and understanding. *"Synthesis in general is merely the work of the imagination, a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we should*

¹ *Vide supra*, Chap. III., Part II., Sec.

have no knowledge whatever, yet of which we are seldom even conscious. But to bring this synthesis to *notions*—that is a function which belongs to the understanding, and in the exercise of which the latter first procures for us knowledge in the real sense.”¹

When, accordingly, in our contemplation of nature, and especially organic nature, Kant ascribes only subjective validity and necessity to the *notion of end*, it conflicts with his *theistic* doctrine, according to which the final end of things, and particularly the origin of life, is deduced from the original ground of things, thus recognizing an end-active power, which is by no means a mere idea. When Kant denies the *knowableness* of inherent natural ends in general, it conflicts with his doctrine of the *natural ends of human life*, which he regarded as a completely knowable and end-conformable mechanism of instincts, by means of which the natural historical progress of mankind is forced to a moral development, and its end unconsciously and involuntarily promoted, though not of course attained. When Kant denies the possibility of an unconscious intelligence and an unconscious activity toward an end—which is necessarily presupposed in the conception of inherent natural ends—this

¹ Kant. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Transcend. Analytik*, § 10. Cf. Fischer. *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. III. (3rd ed.), p. 370

assertion is contradicted not only by his doctrine of morals in the points just mentioned, but also by his doctrine of knowledge—that is, by the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself in its deduction of the pure notions of the understanding, and especially in its doctrine of the *productive imagination*, as being “a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever.”

3. *The Knowableness of Life and of Beauty.*

When Kant teaches that all phenomena originate from the subjective conditions of our reason, *i.e.*, from the material of our own impressions and the form giving faculties or the laws of our thought, this doctrine is contradicted by his view of *organic* phenomena. According to these conditions, there can be no objects in the sense-world which are not composed of such parts as precede the whole; hence Kant also holds that all phenomena, especially bodies, are only mechanically knowable. But, now, there are certain objects with which this relation is reversed. In this case, the whole does not result from the parts, but the parts from the whole. Every object of this sort is a whole which differentiates, articulates, and develops itself. Such phenomena are *living* bodies. Could we perceive a whole before its parts, and derive the latter from the former, then also

an organism would be mechanically knowable, and hence an object of scientific knowledge in the exact sense of the word. But that we cannot do, because such a faculty of perception, such an intuitive understanding, is wanting in us. We are therefore obliged to derive the constitution and parts of an organism from the *Idea* of the whole, and consequently to consider it *teleologically*.

The character, then, of living bodies consists in their being wholes which articulate, organize, and develop themselves. Now, let it be carefully noted that it is not this *character* of the organism, but only the teleological idea of the same, which comes to the account of our reason. What, accordingly, characterizes living phenomena, and makes them what they are, does not permit of being determined from the subjective conditions of our impressions and forms of thought, and is not founded in the general, but in the *specific* conformity to law or type of the phenomena themselves.¹ If there are living things, Kant explains to us in his *Critique of Judgment* why we must conceive of them *teleologically*. That, however, there are living things, or, in other words, that life *appears* to us in the sense-world, the *Critique of Pure Reason* and Transcendental idealism do *not* give

¹ Cf. Fischer : *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii. (3rd ed.), pp. 514-518 ; vol. iv. (3rd ed.), pp. 403-406.

us to understand. On the contrary, when we compare the way in which Kant explains phenomena with the way in which he apprehends the character and fact of life, it remains unexplained and inexplicable, that life appears to us in the natural world at all. We are therefore obliged to conclude either that life *per se* does not belong in the phenomenal world, or that something appears in it, which the criticism of reason cannot derive from our faculties of knowledge, neither from sense, nor from understanding, but which, independently of our ideas and phenomena, underlies life and constitutes its phenomenon. Now, the fact or phenomenon of life is undeniable. Its creative ground, since it subsists independently of our ideas and phenomena, belongs to things-in-themselves, which are to be thought as Ideas and ends, and are, in truth, *will*, the principle of the intelligible, or moral order of the world. We are obliged to conceive this creative ground of life as immanent natural end, *i.e.*, as unconscious intelligence and blind will, and can now no longer hold this conception to be a mere Idea, which we superadd to the phenomenon of life, since, without the reality and activity of inherent natural ends, *i.e.*, without blind will, the fact and phenomenon of life, would not exist at all, and every addition from the side of our reason would be useless. That whole, which differentiates, articulates, and organizes itself, is

the definite end of life, or the will to live, which must assert itself by activity, and develop the necessary organs for the fulfilment of its functions.

And what is true of living phenomena must also be true of *æsthetic*. That there is a state of harmony and freedom for our faculties of mind, in which, independent of all desire and all interests of knowledge, we give ourselves to pure contemplation and enjoyment, follows from the constitution of our intellectual nature. *Æsthetic* pleasure is a pure subjective state, apart from which there could be no talk about *æsthetic* objects. That, however, in this state of free contemplation one object impresses us as beautiful, another as ugly, a third as sublime, must be conditioned by the *peculiar sort* of the phenomena, and can as little as the character of life be derived from the subjective factors, which are the ground of the phenomena and their general conformity to law. There must, accordingly, be something independent of our faculties of reason, which underlies the phenomena themselves, makes them what they are, and which is related to the given phenomenon, as the intelligible character in us is related to the empirical. We must add, that this something becomes known to us from the phenomena themselves, although we do not find the same in the analysis of the given object.

4. *The Knowableness of Things-in-themselves.*

This something is the *thing-in-itself*, the absolute unknowableness of which Kant, it is true, asserted ; but in the progress of his investigations he by no means adhered to this assertion. On the contrary, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment* light was thrown upon the subject in a way which he had not foreseen in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. We know that he still denied in the second edition of the latter the possibility of those principles which he afterwards discovered to be necessary, and made the basis of his criticism of the æsthetic judgment.¹ This very noteworthy fact must not be overlooked. And in criticising the Kantian philosophy we should always remember that it by no means issued from the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a finished system, but that, on the contrary, it unfolded and developed itself, and reached results which were not involved in that work, which do not accord with its fundamental principles, and could not be adjusted to them by any attempt at artificial symmetries, such as the philosopher was so fond of applying. The phenomena to which we add the idea of beauty, of sublimity, or of inner adaptation, are not included among the phenomena whose origin the *Critique of*

¹ Cf. Fischer : *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iv. (3rd ed.), p. 408 *seq.*

Pure Reason investigates; the former are *sui generis*, and include more than these.

According to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, things-in-themselves are the substratum of the nature of our reason as well as of phenomena. They are, therefore, to be absolutely distinguished from phenomena, never confounded with them, hence never with things external to us, but always to be thought of as the unknowable original ground of things. This is the doctrine which runs through the entire *Critique of Pure Reason*, and it is difficult to believe that any one having read this work would dispute its Kantian character. It could not have occurred to Kant to hold the thing-in-itself to be a mere idea, or a mere thought-thing, i e., a cause ascribed by us in thought to phenomena, as it is maintained in numerous recent publications that he did. Were the thing-in-itself a mere thought-thing and nothing more, it would, as such, be completely knowable, and not unknowable and inscrutable, as the *Critique of Pure Reason* nevertheless teaches with the utmost explicitness. If the character of actuality or reality did *not* belong to things-in-themselves, as the original ground of thinking and phenomenal being, the doctrine of their *unknowableness* would be not only meaningless, but absurd. How can anything which in reality does not exist at all, but is merely thought, be seriously regarded

as something unknowable? Whoever, then, thinks that according to the Kantian teaching there is no such thing as the reality of things-in-themselves, must also maintain that Kant has never spoken of their unknowableness. But if any one actually thinks that, then he belongs to the already numerous critics of Kant who write books on his philosophy, yet for whom the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to this day a thing-in-itself.

Every one who has followed the fundamental investigations in this work up to the close of the *Transcendental Analytic*, will have the impression, especially after the section: "On the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects whatsoever as Phenomena and Noumena," that things-in-themselves are and remain unknowable, that they represent the insoluble mystery of the world, and that our knowledge must confine itself to sensible objects and to sensible experience. This new establishment of empiricism, which carries with it the destruction of all metaphysics, often receives the distinction of being the chief service and real result of the Kantian criticism. Thus the Neo-Kantians of the day have stopped short under this impression, and likewise many of our natural scientists, who understand the Königsberg philosopher less than they praise him. They overlook the fact that the *establishment* of empiricism

is not *empiricism*, and cannot be empiricism, that, on the contrary, it consists in the investigation of the principles of all experience, and must therefore result in a Doctrine of Principles, or a "*Metaphysics of Phenomena*," to have established which, Kant regarded as the problem and performance of his doctrine of knowledge. Otherwise he would not have written his *Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic which may claim a Scientific Character*.

When, however, we have followed the course of the *Critique of Pure Reason* further, and reached the close of the *Transcendental Dialectic*, the darkness which obscured the thing-in-itself begins to disappear, although the unknowableness of the same is now confirmed by proofs. We are taught that, and why, we are obliged to conceive of things-in-themselves, that while they are not objects of knowledge, they are nevertheless *necessary Ideas*, which have for their subject the original ground of both thinking and phenomenal objects, as well as the original ground of all possible and actual existence. We now know, furthermore, *what* is to be thought under these original grounds or unconditioned principles, viz, the soul, the world as totality, and God. Among the world-Ideas, *Transcendental* freedom is represented to us as the sole Idea, which, while it can never be a phenomenon or object of knowledge, can yet be the con-

ceivable original ground of all phenomena, and of their order as natural laws. Finally, these ideas serve as a criterion of knowledge; they present themselves as regulative principles of knowledge, *i.e.*, as *goals* of experience, which, it is true, can never be attained, but yet are to be continually striven for, in order that our knowledge may become systematized, and may so combine in itself the highest diversity with the highest unity, that the specific results of the several experimental sciences shall become more and more unified, and approximate a system of knowledge which forms a simple whole. Were such a system attainable, all the sciences would ultimately be members of *one* whole, and the order of the world would become known to us as a genealogical system, in which all phenomena in their various species descend from one single primitive ground. But this primitive ground is unknowable. Hence also the Ideas, since they prescribe "the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity (affinity)" for the experimental sciences, should be recognised only as *maxims* of our knowledge, and not as principles of things.¹ Notwithstanding, in the Doctrine of Ideas, things-in-themselves have so far emerged from the obscurity which enveloped them

¹ Cf. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii. (3rd ed.), pp. 514-518.

that they present themselves, not, it is true, as objects of knowledge, but as principles regulative of knowledge.

The *Doctrine of Methods* in the *Critique* takes a step farther. It reveals to us in its "Canon" the *possibility* of a knowledge of things-in-themselves, not along the path of experience and science, but on the ground of moral laws given by immediate self-knowledge or moral certitude. *If* there are such laws, they have an unconditional validity—a validity independent of all experience, exalted above all knowledge, opinion, and doubt, and possessing immediate axiomatic certainty. And as certain as these laws themselves are, so certain do they make to us the reality of the moral order of the world and of those Ideas which represent its power, final end, and original ground: viz., the Ideas of Freedom, Immortality, and Deity. Thus the *Critique of Pure Reason* leaves us with the possibility of a knowledge of things-in-themselves in view, only we are forced to take this knowledge, not as theoretical, but as practical, to regard its certainty, not as objective, but as subjective or personal, and to designate it, not as science, but as belief.

The *Critique of Practical Reason* realizes the possibility, which the *Doctrine of Methods* had held in prospect. It establishes the fact of the moral law and discerns the reality of freedom and the moral order of the world. That the thing-in-itself underlies our

theoretical reason, the *Critique of Pure Reason* teaches ; that this thing-in-itself is the *will*, the *Critique of Practical Reason* teaches. Under whatever title the knowledge of the thing-in-itself be recognized, the important thing is that it enters into the illumined circle of our reason, not only as Idea, but as reality and power ; we know *what* it is, and we know that the history of human civilization consists in the fulfilment of the laws of freedom and the moral ends of reason, to which our natural ends of life are subordinate and subservient. Kant's Philosophy of the State and Philosophy of Religion, together with the historico-philosophical treatises which belong with them, reveal to us the history of the world as the necessary development and manifestation of freedom.

And that not only the moral, but also the sensible or natural order of the world, or, in other words, that the world-development, not only as history of culture, but also as *history of nature*, is the manifestation of will and of freedom, our philosopher taught in his *Critique of Judgment*. The will is that thing-in-itself which underlies the constitution of our faculties of knowledge, which is the cause of our intellectual development, and makes this subserve the moral. The will is that thing-in-itself which underlies phenomena, and determines their empirical, character in such a way that we are obliged to judge their forms

(in the state of our free contemplation) *æsthetically* and their life *teleologically*. It thus appears that there is something in the empirical character of things which does not admit of being explained from our theoretical reason, nor of being discerned in our experience or in the analysis of phenomena, and yet which is involuntarily present, and necessary to our thought. This something is the phenomenon of freedom and the freedom of phenomenon, or, in one word, *natural freedom*, without which there would be no development, no life, no beauty; without which, therefore, our æsthetic as well as teleological judgment would be without an object.

That there must be a correspondence between the thing-in-itself which underlies our faculties of knowledge and that which underlies phenomena or the sense-world, Kant had already intimated in (both editions of) his *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the *Critique of Judgment* he now asserts it, explaining at the same time in what this correspondence consists. Herewith certain very noteworthy sentences become intelligible, which will have left upon every penetrating reader, after a thorough study of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the impression that the philosopher says more than his doctrine of knowledge justifies. It declares it to be possible that *one and the same* thing-in-itself may underlie both objective and subjective phenomena, or, what

is the same thing, both matter and thought. Let us take his own words: "That something which so affects our sense that it receives the ideas of space, ~~matter~~^{matter}, form, etc.—that something, regarded as noumenon (or, better, as transcendental object), *might also be at the same time the subject of thought*, although, in the way in which our external sense is thereby affected, we receive no perception of ideas, will, etc., but only of space and its determinations."¹ As long as soul and body were regarded as things-in-themselves and radically different substances, it was impossible to explain their union. "The difficulty which has suggested this problem consists, as is well known, in the pre-supposed dissimilarity of an object of the inner sense (soul) and the objects of outer sense, since that depends only upon time, these upon time and space, as the formal conditions of their perception. If we remind ourselves, however, that both sorts of objects do not thereby distinguish themselves from ~~one~~ another inwardly, but only in so far as one *seems* external to the other (*hence that which underlies the phenomenon of matter as thing-in-itself perhaps ought not to be regarded as so dissimilar*), the difficulty vanishes,"² etc.

¹ Kant: *Kritik d. r. Vernunft*: (1st ed.) *Transc. Dialectik. Kritik der Zweiten Paralogismus*. Cf. Fischer: *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iii., pp. 47, 570.

² Kant: *Kritik d. r. Vernunft* (2nd ed.), pp. 326, 327.

If we designate the thing-in-itself which underlies our modes of thought, or the constitution of our faculties of knowledge (theoretical reason), as the unknown quantity X , and the thing-in-itself which underlies external phenomena, or the material world, as the unknown quantity Y , then the *Critique of Pure Reason* has already pointed out to us in both its editions the possibility that $Y=X$. This it was forced to do, since the phenomena of matter are indeed nothing other than our necessary modes of thought. And yet, again, it had no right to assert the possibility that $Y=X$, if things-in-themselves really are as unknowable as it teaches.

Now, the *Critique of Practical Reason* teaches, by establishing the *primacy* of the practical reason, that this is the thing-in-itself which underlies and determines our theoretical reason; it teaches that $X=will$ or *freedom*; and it does not state this proposition with a "perhaps" or "it might be," but with complete certitude.

If, now, $Y=X$, and $X=will$ or freedom, then also Y , the supersensible substratum of the material world, must cease to be a perfectly unknown and unknowable quantity; for $Y=will$ or freedom. Our philosopher must advance to this equation. He does so in the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, the essential purpose of which is to show that the hidden

ground of nature or the material world is one with freedom ; that will and freedom underlie also the sense-world, or, in other words, that the sense-world is the phenomenon of will or the manifestation of freedom. If it were not this there would be no self-developing bodies, no phenomenon of life, no objects of our æsthetic and teleological judgment, no theme of the faculty of judgment, thus also no problem as the subject of a critique of judgment. Hence Kant says in the above-named Introduction : “ *There must, then, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible which underlies nature, with the supersensible which the notion of freedom practically contains. And the notion of this ground, although it does not afford us either a theoretical or a practical knowledge of the same, and hence has no particular sphere, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.*”¹

If we now compare the foundation of the Kantian criticism with its completion, or the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the *Critique of Judgment*, it clearly appears how the work has progressed and been transformed under the hands of the

¹ Kant : *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, Introduction *Vide Werke*, vol. vii., p. 14. Cf. Fischer : *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, vol. iv (3rd ed.), pp. 397, 497. For elucidation of the sentence quoted, cf. *supra*, Chap. III, Part III, Sec. 3.

philosopher. Neither the doctrine of phenomena nor that of things-in-themselves has remained the same. Phenomena now confront us with the character of individuality and freedom, things-in-themselves with that of unity of essence and knowableness; for the correspondence between the supersensible substratum of our sensuous reason and that of the sensible or material world bases itself in the end upon their identity of nature, they are *will* and *freedom*. And herewith the obscurity disappears, which had seemed to envelop things-in-themselves. After the *Critique of Practical Reason* had established the reality of freedom and the moral order of the world, and subordinated our sensuous and theoretical reason to the practical, and the sensible and material world to our theoretical reason, the entire order of the world was recognised as the manifestation of thing-in-itself, or as the phenomenon of will, *i.e.*, as the development and manifestation of freedom.

The farther the Kantian investigations advance, from the doctrine of knowledge to the doctrine of Ideas, from this to the doctrines of moral freedom and the moral order of the world, from these to the philosophic doctrine of history, and to the doctrine of the natural freedom of phenomena (bodies) —which coincides with the criticism of æsthetic and teleological judgment— the more distinctly things-in-themselves come into

view. And the more the Kantian doctrine reveals things-in-themselves in phenomena, and the latter win the character of phenomena of will, so much the more unmistakably does the character of the doctrine of development imprint itself upon the Kantian philosophy; with so much the more distinctness does it prove itself to be, as the problem of Critical thought demands, the philosophical establishment and unfolding of the *history of the development* of universal knowledge. This is the path which the Kantian Doctrine of Ideas points out and follows. It is therefore a very superficial and radically false conception of the Kantian philosophy to understand its doctrine of phenomena and things-in-themselves as dividing the world for the weal of mankind into science and poetry, in the former of which empiricism and materialism are sanctioned as the only valid knowledge, while in the latter metaphysics is saddled upon Pegasus, and the Doctrine of Ideas permitted or compelled to seek its kingdom in the land of dreams. In this way one is in danger, with the author of the *History of Materialism*, of confounding Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* with Schiller's *Partition of the Earth*.

Our examination of Kant's fundamental doctrines has reached the result, that his system received a development in the course of the three *Critiques*, which the first groundwork neither

counted upon nor was sufficient for. After the second *Critique* had made knowing reason dependent upon the law of *moral freedom*, and the third *Critique* had discovered in the beauty as well as the life of phenomena the character of *natural freedom*, new problems arose, which could no longer pass for insoluble on the ground of the unknowableness of things-in-themselves. These problems became the themes of post-Kantian philosophy.

CHAPTER V.

THE PROBLEMS AND LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

I. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

1. *The Metaphysical Problem.*

A SERIES of distinct and historically important systems has sprung, in the course of a few decades, from the roots of the Kantian philosophy. This fact alone shows how manifold and fruitful have been the influences, how deep and far-reaching the stimulus, which the philosophic spirit received through the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Perhaps no philosophical epoch since, the days of Socrates and the Attic philosophy has been so ripe for great and rapid advances as the epoch illuminated by Kant. New problems spring from his criticism—questions which affect the groundwork of philosophy, and which are seized from so many and different sides, that their investigation calls forth variously opposed points of view. And the complicated course

of development which the post-Kantian philosophy takes, branching as it does again and again, finds here its explanation. We see it separating into a number of conflicting lines of development, these dividing up into all sorts of antitheses, and these again into lesser contrasts. Thus there arises a great, and with the onward movement ever-increasing, variety of views, systems, and schools, which on the first outward appearance looks almost like a state of confusion and decline. Yet there rules in these phenomena a necessary law of development. In order to find one's way in the general course and lines of development of post-Kantian philosophy, extending down to the present, one must know the state of the problems which resulted from the character and final form of the Kantian work itself.

The entire theme of the latter consisted, on the one hand, in the doctrine of the *origination* of phenomena from the constitution and faculties of sensuous (=human) reason, and on the other in the doctrine of the *original ground* of phenomena, or the thing-in-itself, which underlies the knowing reason and its sense-world. For since the knowing reason, according to Kant's fundamental doctrine, is of a *sensuous* or receptive and impressionable nature, it itself cannot possibly be the original ground. Since phenomena arise from the impressions or sensations of sensuous reason as their material, sensations cannot possibly

be explained from phenomena; for our philosopher was not of the opinion that the earth rested upon the great elephant, and the great elephant upon the earth. The doctrine of the origination of phenomena from (the material and the thought-forms of) our reason is Transcendental or *Kantian Idealism*. The doctrine of the original ground of our knowing reason and of phenomena we have designated as the *Kantian Realism*, because Kant wishes to have understood by *Transcendental* realism that way of thinking which regards things external to us (*i.e.*, external phenomena) as things-in-themselves.¹

Kant carried out the idealistic establishment of his doctrine of knowledge, but the realistic, with all the questions involved in it, he declared to be impossible, owing to the unknowableness of the thing-in-itself. The realistic establishment would have had to answer the question why our knowing reason has these and not some other thought-forms, why it is thus and not otherwise constituted. But an answer to this question Kant held it would be impossible for any one to give. Nevertheless, he himself in so far answered it, that he made the thing-in-itself intelligible in the "Reality of Freedom" or of pure will, and subordinated the theoretical to the practical reason, Distin-

¹ *Vide supra*, Chap. II, Part I

guishing, now, in the doctrine of knowledge, the quest on concerning the *subjective origin* of phenomena from that concerning their *real ground*, the latter may be taken as constituting the *metaphysical problem*, which Kant declared to be completely insoluble, but which he by no means left completely unsolved. He let so much light fall upon it, that his successors were forced to seek for more, and to attempt the complete illumination of the thing-in-itself in distinction from all phenomena and free from all confusion with them

To obviate all misconceptions, the reader will carefully distinguish, in connection with the Kantian doctrine, between empirical realism and metaphysical realism, that concerns phenomena, this things-in-themselves. Transcendental idealism establishes empirical realism, and is itself established by metaphysical realism.

2 *The Problem of Knowledge*

The Kantian doctrine of knowledge consisted, in the broadest sense, in isolating, fixing, and explaining the fundamental facts of our rational knowledge. These facts were of both a theoretical and a practical (moral) sort. The theoretical facts separated themselves into those of science, or knowledge in the narrower sense, and those of our necessary contemplation or

judgment of things as guided by the Idea of end. The two ground-facts of scientific and, in the exact sense, theoretical knowledge, were those of mathematical and natural science. The two necessary ways of contemplating the adaptation of phenomena to ends, were the æsthetic and teleological points of view, while practical knowledge had the character, *i.e.*, the disposition and moral worth, of our conduct for its object.

These facts of reason, unlike as they are, agree in that they all lay claim to a necessary and universal validity, which presents itself in the form of synthetic judgments *à priori*. The problem of Kant was: How are these facts possible? The question is one of determining their conditions or factors. These were sought and found along the path of *inductive* inquiry. As certain as these facts are, so certain are the conditions from which they follow. And since they are facts of reason, their conditions must be *faculties of reason*. Just as conditions precede that which is conditioned, so these faculties must precede their products, *i.e.*, the facts of our knowledge and objects of knowledge, hence also of our experience and objects of experience. They are, therefore, *before* all experience, or, as Kant expresses it, "*à priori* (transcendental)"; that is, they are *pure* faculties of reason, or such as belong to reason, not as resulting from its experiences, but as preceding all experience.

We see *how* the Critical philosophy proceeds. It isolates and determines the facts of reason; this is its *starting-point*, and constitutes the putting of the question. It analyses these facts, and finds by this inductive method the necessary and original faculties of reason which produce these facts; this is its *method*. It discerns wherein pure reason consists, or the content of what faculties constitute it; this forms its *result*. Do away with any one of the faculties discovered, as, *e.g.*, sensibility or understanding, and you have done away with the possibility of experience. Hence these facts are necessary. Add to the facts discovered another that conflicts with them, as, *e.g.*, an intuitive understanding, or a supersensible perception, and you have done away with the fact of *human* knowledge and experience. Hence such a faculty is impossible. This is the *method of proof* which Kant called the Critical or Transcendental. By his process of induction, Kant claims to have discovered the constitution of our reason, and the laws of our thought and knowledge, with just as much logical consistency and certainty as Kepler did the harmony of the cosmos and the laws of planetary motion. Suspend Kepler's laws, and the phenomena of planetary motion became impossible.

Human reason must combine in itself as many fundamental faculties as there are conditions required for the fact of human

knowledge. Thus the fact of pure mathematics was established by the fact that space and time are the two fundamental forms of our sensibility, and hence pure perceptions; the fact of experimental knowledge or natural science was established by the fact that the understanding, a faculty essentially unlike the sensibility, forms and combines phenomena by means of its pure irreducible notions. These notions are not representative, but synthetic, and of the nature of judgments. What they combine, must be given, hence received, and of a sensuous nature. On this account, our reason is only capable of knowing sensible objects, and not supersensible, such as things-in-themselves. There is accordingly in the arrangement of our faculties of knowledge no intellectual perception or intuitive understanding, to which alone things-in-themselves could be given, and could be intelligible. There is no object without subject, no thought without thinking, no appearance without a being to whom it appears. We should have no common world of sense, no objective experience, if we were not able to arrange, connect, and combine the given material of our impressions according to the same universal laws of thought. To produce phenomena common to all, there is required "the pure consciousness," and "the productive imagination," which operates unconsciously according to the laws of the former. To conceive the given

phenomena, there are required "the faculties of apprehension, of reproductive imagination, and of recognition in the notion," as Kant designates them. Thus we see before us a series of different fundamental faculties, which, according to the calculation of the *Critique*, are necessary in order to create the facts of our knowledge, and the sum-total of which constitutes the productive capital of the *theoretical reason*. But this sum has only the character of a collective unity. †

There is still to be added the fact of *practical knowledge*, which consists in the moral estimate of our dispositions and conduct. This estimate necessarily involves the idea of an absolute command, or of an unconditionally obligatory moral law. But a law that prescribes the course of conduct for our *disposition*, and thus concerns our truest and innermost being, can only be given by ourselves, and consequently demands the faculty of autonomy or freedom, which consists in a completely unconditioned or pure will. The moral law becomes apparent from the fact of our moral judgment, and freedom from the fact of the moral law. The moral law commands: "Thou shalt unconditionally will and act so and not otherwise." In this we recognize the autonomy of our pure will, or the reality of our freedom, which expresses itself in the declaration; "Thou canst, because thou oughtest." Thus Kant also brings us to the know-

ledge of our freedom by the analysis of a fact, *i.e.*, by *induction*, while at the same time he expressly declares that this insight is not of an empirical character.

According to the results of the *Critique*, the *theoretical* reason falls into the antithesis of sense and understanding—the two poles of knowledge—and the *entire* reason into the antithesis of theoretical and practical reason, or into that of the faculties of knowledge and the pure will. To these faculties of reason there correspond the two realms of reason—the sensible and the moral orders of the world, or nature and freedom. There mechanical causality rules, here teleological. Now, it is a fact that there are phenomena which appeal to us involuntarily as adapted or as not adapted to some end, and which we, therefore, judge as *aesthetic* or *teleological*, according as the character of their adaptation is referred merely to our contemplation of them, or to their own existence. There thus adds itself to the theoretical and practical fundamental faculties the reflective judgment, which takes its place between the other two, and itself falls into the two sorts of *æsthetic* and *teleological* judgment.

Thus there results, by the inductive method of the Kantian criticism, by its analysis of the facts of our theoretical and practical knowledge, and of our *æsthetic* and *teleological* contemplation of things, a series of different original faculties, the

collective content of which constitutes our pure reason. These faculties are related to those facts as their ground. The question now arises: *By what are the faculties themselves established?* For we cannot possibly satisfy ourselves with the idea that reason is only their sum or collective notion. Just as the connection between phenomena is the work of reason, so the connection between its own faculties must be of the nature of reason. The sum-total of these faculties, therefore, is not merely collective, but *systematic*; and the system of our faculties of reason must have a determinable common root, from which it is derived. The investigation of this common origin, and the deduction from the nature of reason itself, of all the faculties which Kant represented as primitive powers and made the substratum of the phenomenal world, is the *fundamental problem* which presented itself after the close of the Critical philosophy, as proceeding from its results, and as determining the direction of the investigations that followed.

II. THE LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

1. *The Re-establishment of the Doctrine of Knowledge.*

The question, therefore, in the development of the doctrine of knowledge, and in the solution of its problem, is one of a re-

establishment of the faculties of knowledge. What Kant found by the inductive method is now to be developed by the deductive. The possibility of such a *deduction* depends upon the knowledge of a principle underlying our faculties of knowledge, and hence the constitution of reason in general. Kant had discovered the laws of our thought and of the process of our knowledge by the observation and analysis of the facts of knowledge, just as Kepler did the laws of planetary motion by the observation and computation of its phenomena. After Kepler had discovered these laws inductively, Newton appeared and deduced them from *one* fundamental force and *one* fundamental law. And similarly as Newton is related to Kepler in the establishment of the laws of motion, the post-Kantian philosophy is related to Kant in the establishment of the laws of thought. But this comparison is intended to have no further application than subserves the apprehension of the *problem*, and is used simply to emphasize the deductive character of the latter.

Kant himself had hinted at this deductive development, not only by the deductive or synthetic *mode of exposition* which he followed in his chief work, but also by the arrangement of the faculties of reason themselves. These he not merely co-ordinated, but sought persistently to systematize. The productive imagination was to him the uniting bond between sense and understand-

ing. That these faculties had a common origin was possible, but this origin was unknowable. The practical reason he regarded as the superior faculty, the theoretical as subordinated to it and dependent upon it, the reflective judgment as the uniting bond of both. Thus he had himself, in effect, already given a *system* of the faculties of reason, but it wanted, to be really such, a foundation-principle and unity.

This unity Kant declared to be unknowable, and hence a thing-in-itself. Should it become known, then the solution of the problem of knowledge would be also the solution of the metaphysical problem. It thus appears why the post-Kantian philosophy takes the metaphysical direction (in that it seeks to establish the doctrine of knowledge deductively), and it does so by attaching itself immediately to the Kantian doctrine. It shapes itself in its progressive forms of development into a knowledge of the thing-in-itself; and it is easy to foresee that in this progress the question concerning things-in-themselves and their knowableness will be the theme of pre-eminent and decisive importance. We will add still a second prefatory remark on this point. If the thing-in-itself passes for *unknowable* in the current academic sense of the Kantian doctrine, especially as this is stated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, then the doctrine of its knowableness becomes at once the doctrine

of its *nothingness*, and the post-Kantian philosophy soon enters a stadium where it becomes necessary to dispense with things-in-themselves altogether. There thus arises with the advance of post-Kantian philosophy the important and penetrating question whether the denial or affirmation of the reality of things-in-themselves must go hand in hand with the knowledge of them. An affirmative answer virtually declares for the true *realism* involved in a right understanding of the Kantian doctrine, in opposition to Transcendental idealism, which has no basis. Thus originates the conflict between Realism and Idealism in the post-Kantian metaphysics—a conflict that extends down to our own day.

2. *The Threefold Antithesis: Fries, Herbart, Schopenhauer.*

The immediate problem, then, which the post-Kantian philosophy seizes upon is the establishment of a new doctrine of knowledge from a single principle of reason. This movement has three characteristic features: as doctrine of principles, it is *metaphysical*; as doctrine of unity, it is *monistic*, or, in current historical terms, "System of Identity"; and, since its principle is the thinking knowing reason itself, it is *idealistic*. Each of these characteristic developments calls forth an opposing development, which likewise appeals to the Kantian doctrine,

and seeks to justify itself by laying claim to the true interpretation and criticism of Kant. Thus there arises in the principal directions taken by post-Kantian philosophy a threefold antithesis, each standpoint being a special interpretation and criticism of the Kantian doctrine. The question with each is : What is the truth ? what the deficiencies and errors of the Critical philosophy ? what the permanent, what the perishable in the work of Kant ?

The first antithesis is the most far-reaching. It affirms the necessity of a re-establishment of the doctrine of knowledge, but rejects the metaphysical, monistic, and idealistic (*a priori*) line of development, as not leading to a solution of the problem, and demands the observation of our inner life, *i.e.*, empirical and psychological investigation, as the only means of determining the system of our faculties of reason. The true criticism of reason could be nothing other than "subjective anthropology"; "theory of the inner life"; "natural doctrine of the human mind." Accordingly, not metaphysics, but "*philosophical anthropology*" appears as the fundamental discipline : it is along this line that the criticism of reason and the doctrine of knowledge is to be newly established. The representative of this standpoint is Fries (1773-1843), who founded a school, and has had a lasting influence. His principal works are : *System of*

Philosophy as Exact Science (1804); *Knowledge, Belief, and Presentiment* (1805); and *New Critique of the Reason* (1807).

The latter is the chief work. Post-Kantian philosophy separates itself into the metaphysical and the anthropological movements. What else can the knowledge of *human* reason, hence the criticism of reason, seek to be than subjective or philosophical anthropology? So say Fries and his followers. How can anthropology seek to be the fundamental philosophical discipline when it itself, like all experimental sciences whatsoever, must needs be established? So answer their opponents.

The *second* antithesis has its origin and application within post-Kantian metaphysics. It accepts the metaphysical establishment of the doctrine of knowledge, but utterly rejects the monistic and idealistic features of the movement. It opposes to monism (System of Identity) the plurality of principles, and to idealism, a realism which undertakes to discern and recognize that which truly is (=thing-in-itself) as something absolutely independent of all thought. Kant had rightly grasped things-in-themselves as the supersensible substratum of all phenomena and ideas, and as completely independent of them; and this their character must be scrupulously retained, and the knowledge of them made a matter of earnest pursuit. Every monistic and idealistic metaphysics rests upon the uncritical and radically false

presupposition that one and the same subject has different faculties or powers, *i.e.*, upon the contradictory notion that one is many. Kant himself was under this constant presupposition, since he regarded human reason as of such a nature that it had and united in itself many and essentially different powers. His criticism of reason was in this respect—and in other respects—not critical enough. And this constitutes its fundamental error. It needs, therefore, not only to be completed, but to be reconstructed and built anew from the foundation up; for it worked with notions that are full of contradictions, and hence neither qualified for knowledge nor for testing and establishing knowledge. These contradictory notions are: thing with its attributes and changes, causality, matter, Ego. Accordingly, it must be the first and fundamental problem of philosophy to investigate and rectify our categories of knowledge. This reconstruction and rectification is the theme of a new metaphysics, which opposes itself to all monism and idealism, and, by the removal of the contradictions that fill our natural thinking and constitute its evil, prepares the way for a knowledge of true being, in order, from the point of view of such knowledge, to explain the origin of phenomena and ideas.

The founder of this standpoint is Herbart (1776-1841). The

first foundation-stone was laid by the work *Main Points of Metaphysics* (1808). A synopsis of the whole system was given in the *Introduction to Philosophy* (1813). The principal work, containing the completed system, is the *General Metaphysics* (1829). In concluding the preface to this work, Herbart says : "Kant maintained that 'our notion of an object may contain what and however much you will ; we must nevertheless go outside of it in order to predicate existence of it.' This fact, now, is that to which the present work everywhere points ; and *on this account the author is a Kantian*, if only from the year 1828, and not from the days of categories and the *Critique of Judgment*, as the attentive reader will soon discover. It is not necessary to say more in advance. But let one arm himself with patience, for the chaotic state of previous metaphysics must first be shown ; and it can only be gradually brought to order."¹

The *third* antithesis has its origin and application within the monistic metaphysics. It affirms the metaphysical and monistic knowledge of thing-in-itself as *one* original being underlying all phenomena, and hence all knowledge ; but it rejects every idealistic conception of this original being. In consequence, it identifies original being (thing-in-itself) with thinking, knowing

¹ Joh. Fr. Herbart : *Allgemeine Metaphysik*, Preface, p. xxviii.

reason, transforms it into an abstraction, and hence confounds it with ideas and phenomena. It thus demands the realistic and individualistic apprehension of thing-in-itself, in opposition to the idealistic and abstract. The more abstract original being is thought, or the more it is universalized and designated with such names as "Absolute Identity," "Absolute Reason," "the Absolute," etc., the more exasperated the representative of this opposition to idealism becomes, although he is himself an offspring of the family of Identity-philosophers. The All-One cannot possibly be the universal; that is original, this derived, always derived, and so much the more derivative, the more universal it is. Reason forms its notions by abstracting them from ideals, which themselves are abstracted from sensible perceptions, which latter are produced from the material of our sense-impressions and the perception-forms (space, time, and causality) of our intellect. But these are functions of the brain, which as such presuppose the bodily organism and its stages of development. Nothing, therefore, is more absurd than that conception of the All-One which, turning the matter upside down, seeks to have recognized as the Original, as the absolute First, that which in reality constitutes one of the last links in the chain of derived and dependent phenomena. Since, now, original being cannot be anything universal, it must be sought

✓ in the essence of individuality. Since it does not admit of being derived or of being known mediately, it is only to be discerned immediately, *i.e.*, in ourselves, in our innermost being. Now, the essence of our self-consciousness is effort or volition, the *will* for this definite life-manifestation, this particular existence, this individuality, this character. It is the will, not as consisting, so to say, in consciousness, but as impelling the consciousness on to a certain stage of its bodily manifestation and organization, and hence is the unconscious or *blind* will. But the very same principle which constitutes the essence or innermost being of *our* manifestation, is the essence or being of *all* phenomena. Hence the All-One, the original being, or thing-in-itself, is will. The world and the realm of things in all their gradations are its phenomenon. *That* it is so, is perfectly evident. *Why* and *how* the will appears and objectifies itself in the phenomenal world, remains inscrutable.

The founder of this standpoint is Schopenhauer (1788-1860). He derives his doctrine immediately from the Kantian doctrine, and claims to be the only philosopher who has thought out the latter with logical consistency, and completed it. As metaphysician, he is opposed to Fries; as Transcendental idealist, to Herbart; as realist and individualist, to the idealists of the

System of Identity. He was fond of calling Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel "the three great sophists," in comparison with whom he himself was the Philosopher in the pre-eminent sense. In his first work, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813), he established his point of view; and in his chief work, *The World as Will and Idea* (1819), he carried it out to its logical results. Schopenhauer lived to see late in life his growing fame—a fame which has survived him, and still survives to-day.

III. THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENT OF POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

1. *Metaphysical Idealism.*

The threefold antithesis which we have delineated necessarily presupposes that the thesis to which it is opposed is not only firmly adhered to, but wrought out into such comprehensive and powerful forms that they represent the actual dominating course of development of post-Kantian philosophy. However different the opponents of the thesis and their lines of work may be, they all have one common object of attack; they reject in a body metaphysical idealism, i. e., that movement which makes Critical or Transcendental idealism into metaphysics, or, what is the same thing, which seeks for the original ground of phenomena

within knowing reason. This is utterly false, says Fries, since critical idealism is not metaphysical, but anthropological, and the knowledge of our transcendental faculties not Transcendental (*à priori*), but empirical. From this erroneous conception, which confounds psychology and metaphysics, object of knowledge and mode of knowledge, by regarding knowledge of the transcendental as Transcendental knowledge, there results "the unfounded assumption of the transcendental," "the Kantian prejudice," which dominates the entire metaphysical idealism. This development is utterly false, says also Herbart, since the object of metaphysics is not the knowing reason, but real being *per se*, independent of all thinking and knowing. This development is utterly false, says also Schopenhauer, since the knowing reason is the subjective origin of phenomena, but by no means their original ground.

Nevertheless, metaphysical idealism or the idealistic System of Identity was the first and most direct development that resulted from the Kantian criticism. Kant himself had not only indicated this development, but fixed its course. He had given that significant suggestion, that sensibility and understanding, these two essentially different theoretical faculties, perhaps have a common, but to us unknown, root; he had made theoretical reason dependent upon the practical, and mediated both by the

reflective judgment;¹ he had designated the *unification* of intelligible and empirical character as the theme of the fundamental cosmological problem, and the *unification* of thought and external preception in the same subject, as that of the fundamental psychological problem. Everywhere in the Kantian criticism the inquiry is raised concerning the principle and unity of our faculties of reason. And since this unity passes for unknowable, it is identified with the thing-in-itself, and hence with the subject of a metaphysical problem which Kant declared to be insoluble. The attempt to solve this problem from the nature of reason is of necessity the next step in advance.

2. *The Threefold Advance: Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.*

The problem is, to solve a series of antitheses contained in our reason. The deeper and more comprehensive these opposing faculties are, the deeper and more comprehensive is the unity or common root from which they spring. Consequently metaphysical idealism passes through a series of stadia of development, and increases or deepens and broadens with every step its grasp of the unity of reason. And since what we have here to discover is the origination of our faculties of reason from *one*

¹ Cf. *supra*, Chap. V, Part II, Sec. 1.

primitive ground, the constant theme of metaphysical idealism (which was already formulated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*) is *the doctrine of the development of reason*.

Within the sphere of the knowing or theoretical faculties of reason there lies the antithesis between sensibility and understanding; within the sphere of all the faculties of reason, the antithesis between theoretical and practical reason, or between knowledge and will; within the sphere of the entire world as rational, the antithesis between nature and freedom, or between the sensible and moral orders of the world.

The first question, which comprehends least, is concerned with the unity or common root of our theoretical faculties. It is shown, as a solution, how sense and understanding spring from one and the same faculty, that of representation. This attempt was made by Reinhold (1758-1823) in his *Elementarphilosophie* (1789).

The second question, more penetrating and far-reaching, has to do with all the faculties of reason, the theoretical and the practical. In answer, it is shown how they spring from the pure self-consciousness or Ego (the essence of which is the will) in accordance with the necessary law of development of the mind, which, whatever it is and does, it must also perceive and know. This highly important and decisive advance was made by Fichte

(1762-1814) in his *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794-1799),¹ the fundamental theme of which is nothing other than *the doctrine of the development of mind*.

The third and most comprehensive question deals with the unity of the entire rational world, with the common root of the sensible and moral order of the world, or of nature and freedom. The antithesis of nature and spirit is to be solved by the absolute principle of unity, which is now designated as "the absolute identity or reason." This movement calls itself by preference "System of Identity," and finds its chief representatives in Schelling (1775-1854) and Hegel (1770-1831). The development of reason in the world, or the *rationality of the world-development*, is the doctrine in which they both agree, before their lines of thought diverge. The principal works of the former, so far as they concern this theme, fall within the years 1797-1807, the two foundation-works of the latter, in the years 1807-1816. These, as all other developments of post-

¹ Fichte's chief work, the *Wissenschaftslehre*, is best known by the German title, which it is therefore thought best to retain. A farther reason for doing so might be found in the fact that it has no good English equivalent. As the context perhaps makes sufficiently plain, it is a Theory or Science of Knowledge.

Reinhold's *Elementarphilosophie*, which sought to supply the principle of unity wanting in Kant's *Critique*, is likewise perhaps best retained in the German form. It is a Philosophy of the First Principle—1a

Kantian philosophy, it is not here intended to characterize farther than may be done by hinting at their main features.

The chief problem of this monistic and idealistic metaphysics lies in the solution of the antithesis of nature and spirit, or in the knowledge of their unity. This antithesis must be solved first within the sphere of human nature, then within the sphere of the universe. In the nature of man, sense is in conflict with reason, and human life itself, limited and finite, as it is, appears in opposition to the divine. The unity of man's sensible and intelligible natures consists in *æsthetic freedom*, and develops itself in Beauty and Art. The unity of the divine and human life, as it is felt and experienced in the human mind, consists in *religious feeling* and devout resignation. The æsthetic aspect of Identity finds its representative in Schiller (1759-1805), the religious in Schleiermacher (1768-1834).

In the universe, or in the nature of things as totality, the antithesis to be solved is likewise two-fold: the more restricted one between the natural and intellectual worlds, the deeper and all-comprehensive one between the universe and God. The solution of the first is attained by the notion of natural-rational development, which Schelling grasped on the side of Philosophy of Nature and *Æsthetics*, Hegel on the side of Logic and Theology. The solution of the second is effected by a theisti-

cally (as opposed to pantheism) conceived *doctrine of development of God*, that is, by a theosophy, the theme of which is the world in God, or the freedom and necessity of divine revelation. This standpoint Von Baader (1765-1841) sought to carry out mystically, Schelling, in his later doctrine (which claims the character of positive philosophy), "historically," and as Philosophy of Religion, Krause (1781-1832) rationalistically and ontologically.

The fundamental problem was the re-establishment of the Kantian principles of knowledge and freedom, or of the natural and moral orders of the world. The first question dealt with the method of establishing these principles. Was it metaphysical or anthropological? Within the metaphysical development there arose the question of the unity or plurality of principles, of their reality or ideality. Within the metaphysical System of Identity there arose the question respecting the character of the All One, respecting its reality or ideality. Was it reason or will? universal will or individual will? God or blind will? God in the world, or the world in God?

3. The Order of Post-Kantian Systems

With the logical order of post-Kantian systems the historical is also given, the first is verified by its agreement with the

second. The first development of the Critical philosophy must necessarily have been the metaphysical and idealistic movement; it must have developed in Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling the standpoints of the *Elementarphilosophie* and the *Wissenschaftslehre*, the Philosophy of Nature and the System of Identity, before Fries could oppose to them his "anthropological critique." The history of these standpoints falls within the years 1789-1800. Fries' *New Critique of the Reason* appeared in 1807. The monistic and idealistic metaphysics must have reached its culminating point in Schelling and Hegel before Herbart could appear and oppose all monism and idealism with his new metaphysics. Hegel's *Phenomenology* appeared in 1807, his *Logic* in 1812-1816. Herbart's *Main Points of Metaphysics* followed in 1808, his *Introduction to Philosophy* in 1813. In the same year appeared Schopenhauer's first work. When the latter published his chief work (1819), Hegel had already made known the works which form the foundation of his system, and had begun his influential activity as professor in Berlin. Toward no one of his opponents did Schopenhauer show more hostility than toward Hegel, since (apart from other grounds of animosity) he saw in him the culmination of that perverted development (the philosophy of identity) which he called "nonsense."

In the short period of a generation (1790-1820) post-Kantian

philosophy fixed and wrought out its leading principles, lines of development, and antitheses. In this development one fact is very noteworthy and significant. The new philosophy rests in the first place entirely upon the authority of Kant, and still seeks at the time of the appearance of the *Wissenschaftslehre* to be nothing more than the *well-understood* Kantian doctrine. With Schelling, however, it begins to affect superiority, and it soon becomes fashionable to talk of "old Kant," as of past greatness. Then, on the other hand, as opposed to the threefold idealistic movement, there arises the threefold antithesis, the representatives of which, each in his own way, point back to Kant. Fries wants to be a Kantian without sharing the errors which resulted in "the Kantian assumption" of the idealists who preceded him. Herbart wants to fulfil the demands of the Kantian criticism by applying them to the Kantian doctrine itself, and calls himself a Kantian from the year 1828. Schopenhauer honours the founder of the Kantian philosophy as his teacher and master, as the greatest of all thinkers, and himself claims to be the one genuine Kantian, who has thought out the problem of the master to its end, and found the solution. Thus the Kantian doctrine exercises a controlling power over the subsequent systems, which describe, so to say, their orbits about it, as the centre of motion, and gravitate from

aphelion back again to perihelion. Certainly the present bears witness that in our time the writings of no philosopher are so zealously studied, as fountains of *living* truth, as are the works of Kant.

